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LEGISLATIVE DESIGN AND THE CONTROLLABLE 
COSTS OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
EVAN C. ZOLDAN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Legislation that singles out an identifiable individual for bene-
fits or harms that do not apply to the rest of the population is 
called “special legislation.”  In previous work, I have argued 
that special legislation is constitutionally suspect.  In this Article, 
I explore the normative consequences of special legislation, as-
sessing both the costs it imposes and the benefits that it can pro-
vide.  Drawing on constitutional theory, public choice theory, and 
the history of special legislation, I argue that the enactment of 
special legislation is costly when it reflects the corruption of the 
legislative process and leads to low-quality legislation, unjustifi-
ably unequal treatment, and legislative encroachment on the ju-
dicial and executive functions.  By contrast, special legislation is 
normatively attractive when it addresses a problem unique to a 
particular location, when it addresses a matter of public concern, 
when it reduces rather than exacerbates disuniformity in the law, 
and when it provides relief for underrepresented political minori-
ties.  After considering these costs and benefits, I suggest modifi-
cations to the legislative process to diminish the costs associated 
with special legislation while still preserving its benefits. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Maryland statute creating a special exemption for Tesla did not 
single out the company by name, of course.  But, lawmakers and media ob-
servers had no doubt that the statute’s purpose was to allow Tesla, and no 
other carmaker, to circumvent the traditional manufacturer-dealer relation-
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ship and sell cars directly to consumers.1  The statute itself makes clear that 
it is limited to Tesla alone; it applies only to manufacturers that have no 
dealers in the state and that deal exclusively “in electric or nonfossil-fuel 
burning vehicles.”2  As Maryland’s lawmakers knew, that description ap-
plied only to Tesla.3  And to make sure that no upstart firm might later take 
advantage of the exemption, the legislature limited the number of licenses 
available under the new exception to four.4  Observers noted at the time that 
the law was “specifically crafted for Tesla,”5 and traditional automakers 
agreed to this exception only on the understanding that it “would apply to 
Tesla alone.”6  Maryland’s “Tesla Law” is not unique.  New Jersey and 
Washington, among other states, have passed their own Tesla Laws, ensur-
ing that Tesla, and Tesla alone, can offer electric cars directly to consum-
ers.7 
Tesla Laws can be viewed, if taken in isolation, as the result of one 
company’s shrewd lobbying and public relations campaign to obtain a mar-
ket advantage.  But, there is a richer story to be told—a story about the 
power of legislatures to single out named individuals for special treatment 
not accorded to anyone else.  Statutes that grant special treatment to particu-
lar individuals—often called “special legislation”—are routinely, and often 
quietly, enacted by state legislatures and Congress every year. 
The Anglo-American legal tradition reflects a suspicion of statutes, 
like Tesla Laws, that single out individuals for special treatment.  Legal 
philosophers have long argued that special legislation tests the limits of 
what may be considered “law.”  John Locke wrote that the legislature may 
not “rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees.”8  Instead, it is confined to en-
                                                          
 1.  Matthew Debord, Maryland Carved out an Innovative Special Exception for Tesla to Sell 
Cars Directly to Consumers, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 15, 2015), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/maryland-carved-out-a-special-exception-for-tesla-to-sell-cars-
directly-to-customers-2015-4; Angelo Young, Tesla Motors Inc. (TSLA) Wins Approval for Direct 
Car Sales in Maryland, Starting October 1, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.ibtimes.com/tesla-motors-inc-tsla-wins-approval-direct-car-sales-maryland-starting-
october-1-1918655. 
 2.  MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 15-305(e)(2)(i) (2018). 
 3.  Debord, supra note 1. 
 4.  MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 15-305(e)(2)(ii). 
 5.  Young, supra note 1. 
 6.  Debord, supra note 1. 
 7.  Daniel Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Capitalism, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 573, 584–85 (2016); Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepre-
neurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 439–40 (2017); Andrew Thurlow, Washington Governor Signs 
Tesla Compromise Bill, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Apr. 8, 2014), 
https://www.autonews.com/article/20140408/RETAIL07/140409837/washington-governor-signs-
tesla-compromise-bill. 
 8.  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 136 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690).  
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acting laws that are “common to every one of that society”9 and that may 
not be varied “in particular cases.”10  Similarly, William Blackstone distin-
guished the concept of a civil law, which is “permanent, uniform, and uni-
versal,” from a statutory order to a single individual, which he called “a 
sentence” rather than a law.11  The United States Supreme Court invoked 
this long tradition when it noted that “not every act, legislative in form” can 
be considered “law.”12  Rather, “a special rule for a particular person or a 
particular case,” including “acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, 
and acts directly transferring one man’s estate to another,” are simply ex-
cluded from its definition.13 
Modern philosophers of law, too, have struggled to explain whether a 
statute directed to a particular person can be considered law.  In his seminal 
work, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart wrestles to define law in a way that 
excludes the “gunman case”—that is, Hart seeks a definition of “law” that 
excludes the demand of an armed gunman to a bank clerk to hand over the 
money in his care.14  One way that Hart distinguishes the demand of an 
armed gunman from the threat of punishment for violating a properly 
promulgated criminal law is the fact that the latter case, but not the former, 
requires the application of a generally applicable rule of conduct to a partic-
ular situation.  Although a law sometimes can be directed at an individual, 
Hart argues, the “standard form” of a law “applies to a general class of per-
sons who are expected to see that it applies to them and to comply with 
it.”15  In light of this distinction, the individualized order of a policeman, 
while resembling superficially the gunman’s demand to the bank clerk, is 
quite different.  The policeman enforces rules (for example, stop at stop 
signs) against particular individuals; but, the rules themselves are generally 
applicable—that is, everyone is bound to obey them.  By contrast, the gun-
man’s demand applies to the clerk alone.16  Relying on this distinction be-
tween generally applicable rules and individualized commands, Hart con-
cludes that “it is normally understood that . . . [a modern state’s] general 
laws extend to all persons within its territorial boundaries.”17  Similarly, 
although stopping short of suggesting that every particularized statute falls 
                                                          
 9.  Id. at § 22. 
 10.  Id. § 142. 
 11.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *44.  By con-
trast, acts of Parliament that “only operate upon particular persons, and private concerns,” called 
“[s]pecial or private acts,” were required to be formally pleaded before judges would take notice 
of them.  Id. at *86. 
 12.  Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). 
 13.  Id. at 535–36.  
 14.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 20–22 (2012). 
 15.  Id. at 21. 
 16.  Id. at 21–22. 
 17.  Id. at 21.  
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outside the definition of “law,” Lon Fuller argues that the generality of law 
is the “first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules.”18  As a result, a system that fails to promulgate gener-
ally applicable rules has failed to make law.19 
Whether special legislation is “law” is an issue separate from whether 
it is a normatively attractive way of setting legal rights and obligations.  
Philosophical arguments aside, therefore, we can ask whether a legislature 
should target an individual for special treatment not applicable to the popu-
lation at large.  This is not (merely) an academic question.  Both state legis-
latures and Congress routinely enact statutes, like the Tesla Laws described 
above, that target a particular individual.  Through special laws, Congress 
and state legislatures grant public funds to named individuals,20 exempt par-
ticular people from generally applicable laws,21 and even intervene in pend-
ing court cases to favor one litigant over another.22  Identifying the norma-
tively attractive and unattractive features of special legislation, and 
proposing ways that legislatures can minimize its unattractive features, are 
the subjects of this Article. 
This Article is part of a long-term project that describes and defines 
the parameters of a constitutional principle that favors generality in legisla-
tion and disfavors special legislation.  This principle, which I introduced in 
prior work,23 may be called a value of legislative generality.  A value of 
legislative generality finds support in the Constitution’s history, text, and 
jurisprudential underpinnings.  First, in the decade after independence, new-
ly independent state legislatures enacted all types of particularized statutes.  
These statutes transferred title to land,24 granted exemptions from the stand-
                                                          
 18.  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46 (1969). 
 19.  Id. at 46–49. 
 20.  Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565 
(2013) (transferring $174,000 to named individual). 
 21.  Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. 115-2, § 1, 131 Stat. 6, 6; Priv. L. No. 111-1, § 1, 124 Stat. 
4523, 4523–24 (2010). 
 22.  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (upholding a statute intervening in a par-
ticular, pending lawsuit); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (upholding a 
statute picking the winner in one particular, pending case); see Evan C. Zoldan, Is the Federal 
Judiciary Independent of Congress, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 135 (2018). 
 23.  Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (2014) [herein-
after Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality]; Evan C. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component 
of Legislative Generality, 51 RICH. L. REV. 489 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The Equal Protection 
Component]; Evan C. Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing Solution, 
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The Klein Rule]. 
 24.  COUNCIL OF CENSORS, A Report, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, AS ESTABLISHED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION 35, 40 (Philadelphia, Francis 
Bailey 1784) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT]. 
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ing laws,25 confiscated property from named individuals,26 and punished 
political undesirables.27  After a decade of suffering from social and eco-
nomic dislocations caused by special legislation, the revolutionary genera-
tion wholeheartedly repudiated their legislatures’ power to enact it.  By the 
mid-1780s, in their writings, speeches, and debates, the revolutionary gen-
eration denounced their legislatures in no uncertain terms for “extending 
their deliberations to the cases of individuals.”28  On the eve of the drafting 
of the Constitution, ordinary and prominent members of the revolutionary 
generation alike made clear that American republicanism was inconsistent 
with the legislative imposition of privileges or burdens on identifiable indi-
viduals.29 
Second, a value of legislative generality is supported by the clauses of 
the Constitution, and other constitutional principles, that disfavor legislation 
targeting identifiable individuals for particularized treatment.  These clauses 
and principles include the Bill of Attainder,30 Ex Post Facto,31 Contract,32 
Equal Protection,33 Due Process,34 Takings,35 and General Welfare36 claus-
es, as well as the Klein rule of decision principle.37  Although none of these 
provisions or principles is exclusively about legislative generality, each 
contributes to the value of legislative generality because each disfavors or 
                                                          
 25.  Address of the Council of Censors (Feb. 14, 1786), in RECORDS OF THE COUNCIL OF 
CENSORS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 58, 60–70 (Paul S. Gillies & D. Gregory Sanford eds., 
1991) [hereinafter VERMONT REPORT]. 
 26.  BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 302 
(1967). 
 27.  GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 279 
(1969). 
 28.  PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 24, at 38. 
 29.  WOOD, supra note 27, at 401.  For an extended historical argument about the revolution-
ary generation’s rejection of targeted legislation, see Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, su-
pra note 23, at 669–79. 
 30.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441–
42 (1965). 
 31.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1; Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and 
the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693 (1960). 
 32.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 33.  U.S. CONST. amend XIV; Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000). 
 34.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 
52–53 (2003). 
 35.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Court has recognized that “the sovereign may not take the 
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is 
paid just compensation.”  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
 36.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The Court has suggested that appropriations must be lim-
ited to expenditures designed “to provide for the general welfare.”  Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
619, 632, 640 (1937). 
 37.  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144–47 (1871).  The Klein rule of deci-
sion principle provides that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision for the federal courts to 
follow in a particular pending case.  See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 23, at 2133. 
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prohibits a certain type of particularized legislation.38  For example, the 
Equal Protection Clause is primarily concerned with government classifica-
tions of individuals into groups according to some identifiable characteris-
tic.39  However, the Court has also emphasized that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits legislative specification by limiting the government’s 
power to single out an individual as a “class of one.”40  Similarly, although 
the Due Process Clause has been applied to a wide array of government ac-
tions, one of its oldest applications prohibits the legislature from “taking the 
property of A and giving it to B.”41  In this same way, each of the above-
noted clauses and principles reinforces legislative generality, either because 
of the effect given to it by the Court, its place in the constitutional structure, 
or the historical experiences that gave rise to its inclusion in the Constitu-
tion. 
Third, jurists and philosophers of law have long argued either that tar-
geted legislation is outside the legislative power altogether or that it is bad 
law.  As noted above, Locke suggested that a statute singling out an indi-
vidual for special treatment simply is not within the legislative power.42  
Moreover, commentators assessing the normative implications of special 
legislation have concluded that it is “unjust,”43 “unfair,”44 and iniquitous.45 
This Article advances the broad project outlined above by assessing 
the costs and benefits of special legislation and suggesting modifications to 
the legislative process to reduce special legislation’s costs without eliminat-
ing its benefits.   
Part I defines special legislation and provides examples that elucidate 
its key features. 
Part II describes the costs that special legislation imposes on society.  
Although not every special law imposes these costs, special legislation usu-
ally reflects some combination of the following: corruption of the legisla-
tive process; low-quality legislation; unjustifiably unequal treatment; and 
legislative encroachment on the judicial and executive functions. 
Part III mounts a limited defense of special legislation.  Special legis-
lation persists despite the costs described above, in part, because special 
                                                          
 38.  Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 23, at 653. 
 39.  See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). 
 40.  Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
For an explanation of the “class of one” doctrine, see Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, 
supra note 23, at 525–31. 
 41.  ORTH, supra note 34, at 52–53; see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).  
 42.  LOCKE, supra note 8, § 142. 
 43.  Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Laws, in ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 
173 (James E. G. Zetzel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). 
 44.  FULLER, supra note 18, at 47. 
 45.  VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 67–68. 
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legislation can also benefit society.  Specifically, special legislation can be a 
useful way to address a problem unique to a particular location, serve a pub-
lic purpose, cure disuniformities created by the generally applicable laws, 
and provide relief for politically marginalized individuals. 
Part IV suggests an approach to special legislation that is more nu-
anced than the one currently taken by the states and Congress.  Many states 
broadly prohibit special legislation despite the benefits that it can provide. 
Federal law, by contrast, places almost no restrictions on special legislation 
despite its costs.  Identifying special legislation’s costs and benefits sug-
gests, however, that neither of these approaches is optimal.  Instead, both 
Congress and state legislatures can reduce the costs of special legislation 
without completely eliminating its benefits by modifying their rules of pro-
cedure.  Specifically, legislatures should consider adopting one or more of 
the following procedural rules: a rule requiring that special legislation may 
be enacted only by a legislative supermajority; a rule requiring public notice 
and providing an opportunity for public participation before special legisla-
tion is enacted; and a rule prohibiting special legislation unless it is accom-
panied by an official statement of the law’s purpose. 
This Article offers a few contributions to the existing literature on spe-
cial legislation.  First, discussions of special legislation normally focus ex-
clusively on special legislation enacted by state legislatures.46  This Article, 
by contrast, draws on examples of both state and federal special legislation.  
By recognizing that both Congress and state legislatures enact special legis-
lation, this Article is able to draw on a more robust set of examples and, as 
a result, is better able to evaluate special legislation’s costs and benefits.  
Second, the costs of special legislation are often described as historically 
contingent—that is, commentators have described the costs of special legis-
                                                          
 46.  CHARLES CHAUNCEY BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6 (1894); WILLIAM BACKUS GUITTEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS UPON SPECIAL LEGISLATION CONCERNING MUNICIPALITIES 8 (1905); ROBERT 
LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS: DEVELOPMENT, STATUS, AND TREND OF THE TREATMENT AND 
EXERCISE OF LAWMAKING POWERS 532 (1935); Lyman Cloe & Sumner Marcus, Special and Lo-
cal Legislation, 24 KY. L.J. 351, 356 (1936); Dan Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional 
Theory to the Interpretation of State Constitutions: The Ban on Special Laws in Maryland, 71 MD. 
L. REV. 411, 441 (2012); Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and 
Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 642 (1994); Thomas F. Green, A Malapropian Pro-
vision of State Constitutions, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 359, 363 (1939); Frank E. Horack, Special Legis-
lation: Another Twilight Zone Part I, 12 IND. L.J. 109, 115 (1936); Frank Horack & Matthew 
Welsh, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone Part III, 12 IND. L.J. 183, 183 (1937); Robert 
M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in the Nineteenth-Century 
United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 277–78 (2004); Justin R. Long, State Constitutional 
Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 723 (2012); Anthony Schutz, State Con-
stitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural Restraints, 40 J. LEGIS. 39, 43 (2014).  
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lation in particular time periods, including the colonial period,47 during the 
confederation era48 or the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.49  
This Article analyzes special legislation from a theoretical rather than a his-
torical perspective, revealing that the costs and benefits of special legisla-
tion are not historically contingent.  Third, although the costs of special leg-
islation have been described by commentators, with limited exception, the 
benefits of special legislation have been overlooked.50  This Article argues 
that, normatively, special legislation should not be treated monolithically.  
Rather, it can provide benefits as well as impose costs.  Fourth, most recent 
work on special legislation (including my own work) has focused on 
whether special legislation is constitutional.51  This Article considers 
whether, constitutional arguments aside, legislative rules can be designed to 
reduce special legislation’s costs without eliminating its benefits altogether.  
As a result, this Article is addressed to legislatures—both state legislatures 
and Congress—rather than to state or federal courts. 
I.  SPECIAL LEGISLATION DEFINED 
A statute that targets an individual or a small, identifiable group for 
treatment that is not imposed on the population in general is often called 
special legislation.52  Although there is no universal definition, special leg-
islation is most often defined as a statute that targets one, named person.53  
                                                          
 47.  RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD 
BEFORE 1825, at 19–20, 64 (1917) (describing the flood of petitions that tied up the legislative 
process). 
 48.  E.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 36–37 (1914); see also 
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1331 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995). 
 49.  E.g., BINNEY, supra note 46, at 6; GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 8; Ireland, supra note 46, 
at 277–78. 
 50.  E.g., GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7–10; Ireland, supra note 46, at 271–280; cf. BINNEY, 
supra note 46, at 10, 174–75; Horack, supra note 46, at 113. 
 51.  Gillette, supra note 46, at 631; Long, supra note 46, at 723; Zoldan, Reviving Legislative 
Generality, supra note 23, at 688. 
 52.  E.g., State ex rel. Atkins v. Lawler, 205 N.W. 880, 883 (N.D. 1925) (“[A] ‘special 
law’ . . . relates only to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a ‘general 
law,’ which applies to all things or persons of a class . . . .”); State ex rel. Pub. Welfare Comm’n v. 
Cty. Court, 203 P.2d 305, 315 (Or. 1949) (“A special [law] . . . is only applicable to particular in-
dividuals or things.”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *86 (“Special or private acts operate upon 
particular persons, and private concerns.”); see also THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE LAW, 
PRIVILEGES PROCEEDINGS AND USAGES OF PARLIAMENT 824 (Gilbert Campion ed., 14th ed. 
1946). 
 53.  See ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. IV, § 110 (“A special or private law is one which applies 
to an individual, association or corporation.”); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) 
(distinguishing a general law from a “special rule for a particular person or a particular case”); 
CCI Entm’t v. State, 215 Md. App. 359, 396, 81 A.3d 528, 549 (2013) (holding that a  “special 
law is one that relates to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law 
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Despite this rule of thumb, defining special legislation poses some difficul-
ty.54  Individualized legislation is often,55 but not always,56 considered spe-
cial.  Moreover, legislation that targets more than one person, like two ac-
cused co-conspirators57 or a handful of corporations,58 also can be 
considered special, whether or not the statute specifically names its tar-
gets.59 
The definitional difficulty stems from the fact that all laws apply to 
some class less than the total population.60  Most of these laws are uncon-
troversial.  For example, a law that taxes industrial property at a lower rate 
than residential property treats some members of the population differently 
than others.  But, a targeted law like this is considered “general” rather than 
special because the differences between industrial and residential property 
                                                          
which applies to all persons or things of a class.” (quoting Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 
553, 567, 431 A.2d 663 (1981))). 
 54.  LUCE, supra note 46, at 533 (noting that a law affecting one person may reflect a broad 
policy and a law generally written may affect only a few individuals); MAY, supra note 52, at 
826–27 (noting the challenge of determining whether a statute is for the public or private benefit 
at the margins, but concluding that the distinction is useful); see Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation, 
Public Choice and the Structural Constitution, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 184–85 (1997) 
(discussing the challenge of distinguishing between class legislation and public interest legisla-
tion). 
 55.  E.g., CCI Entm’t, 215 Md. App. at 397, 81 A.3d at 549 (identifying a law as special if “a 
particular individual or business sought and received special advantages from the Legislature”); 
Perry Civil Twp. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 51 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 1943) (“A special 
law is one made for individual cases . . . .”). 
 56.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (upholding a law singling out 
former President Nixon because it created a “legitimate class of one”); General Motors Corp. v. 
Dep’t. of Treasury, 803 N.W.2d 698, 713 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (“[A law] may be general within 
the constitutional sense and yet, in its application, only affect one person or one place.” (quoting 
Rohan v. Detroit Racing Ass’n, 22 N.W.2d 433, 441 (Mich. 1946))); Excise Bd. v. Lowden, 116 
P.2d 700, 703 (Okla. 1941) (“[A] law may be general and yet have only one local application.”). 
 57.  People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 381–82 (Colo. 2005) (statute creating class of two co-
conspirators violated prohibition on special legislation).  
 58.  Opyt’s AMOCO, Inc. v. Vill. of S. Holland, 568 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ill. App. 1991) (“Spe-
cial legislation confers a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to 
the exclusion of others similarly situated.”). 
 59.  City of Topeka v. Gillett, 4 P. 800, 804 (Kan. 1884) (“[Legislation] may be special where 
it simply describes the particular persons or things so that they may be known, as well as where it 
gives their particular names . . . .”); Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 553, 569, 431 A.2d 
663, 673 (1981) (“[S]tatutory provisions which did not name particular individuals or entities have 
been held to be prohibited special laws, whereas enactments naming specific entities have been 
held not to be special laws.” (citations omitted)). 
 60.  Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 343–44 (1949).  Jeremy Bentham made the same point a century ago: “If we were to lay 
down as a principle that all men ought to enjoy ‘equal rights,’ we should thereby and of necessity 
render legislation impossible: for the law is ever establishing inequalities, as it cannot bestow 
rights upon some without, at the same time, imposing obligations upon others.” JEREMY 
BENTHAM, 1 BENTHAM’S THEORY OF LEGISLATION 127–28 (Charles Milner Atkinson trans., 
1914). 
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make the distinction “rational” or “reasonable.”61  Classification becomes 
controversial when the legislature appears to be conferring some unearned 
benefit or levying some undeserved punishment.  Legislation that singles 
out an individual or a very small group in this way is often called special 
legislation.62 
Two examples highlight some of special legislation’s less obvious fea-
tures.  First, consider “Terri’s Law,” the well-known statute enacted to re-
solve the fate of Terri Schiavo.  After Schiavo suffered cardiac arrest and 
fell into a persistent vegetative state, Schiavo’s parents and husband battled 
over whether to withdraw her life support.63  When a state court required 
her hospice facility to withhold food and water,64 Congress enacted a statute 
allowing “any parent” of Terri Schiavo to bring suit in federal district court 
to redress this decision.65  Through Terri’s Law, Congress set aside the pre-
vious decade of state court litigation over Schiavo’s intentions, permitting 
relitigation of previously adjudicated issues.  The law was targeted to ad-
dress Schiavo’s situation alone: it applied only to “any parent” of Schiavo 
and specifically provided that it would not serve as a precedent for future 
legislation.66  Limited to one event and providing relief for two people only, 
Terri’s Law afforded a special exemption from general preclusion rules that 
apply to all other suits in district court. 
Second, consider the statute that singled out a particular individual, 
James Mattis, and provided that he was eligible to be appointed Secretary of 
Defense.67  This targeted statute was an explicit exception to the generally 
applicable law, which provides that a person may not be appointed Secre-
tary of Defense within seven years of being relieved from active duty as an 
officer of the armed forces.68  In Congress, the bill was introduced as “a 
one-time exemption on behalf of an individual;” proponents candidly 
acknowledged that the proposed legislation would not “permanently change 
the law.”69  To erase all doubt about the particularized nature of the statute, 
                                                          
 61.  See Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game Dep’t, 289 P.3d 32, 38 
(Idaho 2012) (opining that if the state has a “legitimate interest” in enacting the targeted law, and 
the classification is not “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,” it is not a special law). 
 62.  Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 23, at 496; see, e.g., Martin’s Ex’rs 
v. Commonwealth, 102 S.E. 77, 80 (Va. 1920) (noting that special legislation often includes stat-
utes “conferring special privileges and immunities, or special restrictions and burdens, upon par-
ticular persons or localities to the exclusion of other persons or localities similarly situated”). 
 63.  Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 107–08 (2004). 
 64.  In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 65.  Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15, 15. 
 66.  Id.; see Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 23, at 629. 
 67.  Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, § 1, 131 Stat. 6, 6. 
 68.  10 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012). 
 69.  163 CONG. REC. H480 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2017) (statement of Rep. Newhouse). 
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the statute itself provided that it was a “limited exception,” applying “only 
to the first person appointed as Secretary of Defense” after the statute’s en-
actment and “to no other person.”70 
Both Terri’s Law and the Mattis waiver statute provide exceptions 
from generally applicable laws for known individuals.  A close look at these 
statutes reveals a few of the peculiar attributes of special legislation.  One, 
although courts and commentators have declined to refer to targeted federal 
statutes as special, federal statutes also can be tailored to affect a single in-
dividual or small group of known individuals.  Under common definitions 
of “special law,”71 therefore, targeted federal laws like the Mattis waiver 
statute and Terri’s Law should be considered special.72 
Two, like the Mattis waiver statute (or the Tesla Laws described in the 
Introduction), a law can be tailored to affect a single person or company 
without naming the target directly.  Nevertheless, if the purpose or effect of 
a statute is to single out a known individual for special treatment, courts of-
ten consider it special.73 
Three, like Terri’s Law, statutes can be targeted to reach a small num-
ber of people rather than a single individual.  Terri’s Law, for example, 
provided an exemption for “any parent” of Schiavo.  But, even when a class 
contains more than one person, when the class is defined to prevent indi-
viduals from entering or leaving the class in the future, courts often consid-
er the legislation special.74 
Four, special legislation is broader than, and includes, “private legisla-
tion.”  Private legislation is legislation introduced for the relief of a particu-
lar named individual.  Unlike special legislation more generally, private leg-
islation always names a particular individual, is titled “for the benefit” or 
“relief” of a particular named party,75 and, in Congress, is restricted under 
                                                          
 70.  § 1, 131 Stat. at 6. 
 71.  E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 110 (“A special or private law is one which applies to an 
individual, association or corporation.”); Best v. Taylor Mach., Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1069 
(Ill. 1997). 
 72.  Indeed, the failure of federal courts to recognize targeted laws as special is surprising 
because, for nearly a century, federal law explicitly prohibited federal territorial legislatures from 
enacting special laws.  Act of July 30, 1886, ch. 818, § 1, 24 Stat. 170, 170 (repealed 1983).  Dur-
ing this time, federal courts invalidated special laws enacted by territorial legislatures.  Smith v. 
Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 240 F. Supp. 809, 810–11 (D.V.I. 1965). 
 73.  See supra note 59. 
 74.  People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 384 (Colo. 2005) (“By contrast, a class that is drawn so 
that it will never have any members other than those targeted by the legislation is illusory, and the 
legislation creating such a class is unconstitutional special legislation.”). 
 75.  CHARLES W. JOHNSON ET AL., HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES, PRECEDENTS, 
AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 166–67 (2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-
HPRACTICE-115/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-115.pdf (“A private bill is a bill for the benefit of one 
or several specified persons or entities” as opposed to being for a public benefit); see, e.g., Priv. L. 
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legislative rules applicable only to private laws.76  By contrast, many spe-
cial laws, like the Mattis waiver (and Tesla Laws), are denominated as pub-
lic laws despite their obviously targeted nature, do not name their target, 
and are treated for procedural purposes as public laws. 
Terri’s Law and the Mattis waiver statute are far from unique; Con-
gress and state legislatures routinely enact special laws, including, in recent 
years, statutes granting public funds to named individuals,77 statutes ex-
empting particular people from generally applicable laws,78 and even stat-
utes intervening in pending court cases to favor one of the litigants.79  
Whether the existence of special legislation is normatively attractive or not 
depends on the costs it imposes and the benefits it provides.  In Part II, I as-
sess the costs of special legislation; in Part III, I assess its benefits. 
II.  THE COSTS OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
Rather than addressing broad social problems,80 establishing rules for 
future lawmaking,81 or vesting authority in other government actors,82 all of 
which provide stability and security to society, special legislation tends to 
be destabilizing.  Indeed, the threats to personal security, property rights, 
and political equality created by special legislation were among the most 
pressing concerns that prompted the framing of the federal Constitution.83  
Likewise, the corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency that accompanied 
                                                          
No. 112-1 (2012) (providing an exemption from the Immigration and Nationality Act for one 
named person). 
 76.  RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XII, cl. 4, at 25 (2019) (prohibiting pri-
vate bills related to pensions, bridges, military records, or money claims that are cognizable under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act from being received or considered); see also STANDING RULES FOR 
THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XIV, cl. 9–10, at 10 (2013) (same). 
 77.  Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565 
(2013) (transferring $174,000 to a named individual). 
 78.  Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, § 1, 131 Stat. 6, 6; Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 
4523 (2010). 
 79.  Act of Sept. 26, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2, 128 Stat. 1913, 1913 (applying to one 
particular piece of property); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1317 (2016) (upholding 
a statute picking the winner in one particular, pending case); Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 
1198, 1204–08 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 80.  For example, Jeremy Bentham described the purpose of legislation as “the happiness of 
the body politic,” which included subsistence, abundance, equality, and security.  BENTHAM, su-
pra note 60, at 123; see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 
411–12 (1983) (noting that a legitimate public purpose includes “the remedying of a broad and 
general social or economic problem”). 
 81.  Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 
717 (2005) (describing statutes that provide decision-making process for future legislation).  
 82.  Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
369, 372 (1989) (“Modern legislation in its essence is an institutional practice by which the legis-
lature . . . issues directives to the governmental mechanisms that implement that policy.”). 
 83.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995); CORWIN, supra note 48, at 36–
37, 62; EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 148–50 (1919). 
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special legislation in the nineteenth century prompted states nationwide to 
convene constitutional conventions.84  Although not every special law im-
poses all of the costs described below, in the aggregate, a system that per-
mits unrestricted special legislation encourages the following overlapping 
harms: corruption of the legislative process; low-quality legislation; unjusti-
fiably unequal treatment; and legislative encroachment on the judicial and 
executive functions.  This Part describes each of these costs. 
A.  Special Legislation Encourages Legislative Corruption 
 The power to enact special legislation allows lawmakers to create a 
valuable public good that they can then trade for private gain.85  Because 
legislatures have the ability to confer great privileges on favored constitu-
ents, the power to enact special legislation permits legislatures to supply 
special privileges that are demanded by motivated constituents.86  This dy-
namic often results either in bribes to individual legislators to introduce and 
support special bills or, even in the absence of bribery, special legislation to 
benefit politically powerful or well-connected individuals. 
First, special legislation often leads to bribery.  When special legisla-
tion dominated state legislative practice in the nineteenth century, bribery to 
secure the passage of special laws was widespread.87  Contemporary ob-
servers noted that special legislation was “often pushed through the legisla-
tures by unscrupulous men”88 who exchanged special legislation for 
bribes.89  Some of these private bills required the purchase of worthless land 
at extravagant prices solely to enrich landowners.  Others required the im-
provement of streets without inhabitants “for no other purpose than to 
award corrupt contracts for the work.”90  Special laws “abolishing one of-
                                                          
 84.  E.g., Horack, supra note 46, at 115; Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1070 
(Ill. 1997). 
 85.  GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS 148–49 (2006); Zephyr Teachout, 
The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 373–74 (arguing that corruption in-
cludes “self-serving use of public power for private ends”). 
 86.  Richard T. Boylan, Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying, 111 
PUB. CHOICE 19, 25–27 (2002) (discussing supply and demand for private immigration bills and 
their connection to corruption). 
 87.  LUCE, supra note 46, at 548; Ireland, supra note 46, at 277–78. 
 88.  BINNEY, supra note 46, at 6. 
 89.  Maple Run at Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. 1996) 
(special legislation prohibition “prevents lawmakers from engaging in the ‘reprehensible’ practice 
of trading votes for the advancement of personal rather than public interests” (citing Miller v. El 
Paso Cty., 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (1941))); LUCE, supra note 46, at 548 (special legislation is a 
“prolific source of bribery and corruption”); Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 356 (special legis-
lation is “fertile ground for log rolling and bribery”); Green, supra note 46, at 363 (“[L]obbying, 
log-rolling, and corruption increase . . . when the legislature customarily passes local legisla-
tion.”). 
 90.  GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 8. 
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fice and creating another with the same duties” were enacted to transfer lu-
crative government jobs from one person to another.91  And seekers of val-
uable and scarce special incorporation laws created “a political culture of 
bribery and extortion” by competing with one another for these special priv-
ileges.92 
The phenomenon of bribery in exchange for special legislation is not 
limited in time to the nineteenth century.  In a series of scandals in the 
1960s and 1970s, members of Congress were investigated,93 indicted,94 
forced to resign,95 and convicted96 after allegations were made that they re-
ceived bribes in exchange for introducing and supporting special legisla-
tion.  In 1969, credible allegations that senators and their staff members had 
accepted bribes in exchange for introducing hundreds of bills to protect 
Chinese nationals from deportation prompted Senate hearings and a change 
in Senate rules to make the special immigration bill process more transpar-
ent.97  In the mid-1970s, a congressman from New Jersey was indicted for 
accepting thousands of dollars from foreign nationals in return for sponsor-
ing immigration bills to permit them to remain in the United States.98  After 
these events, and years of allegations of bribery related to special immigra-
tion bills, the government orchestrated the notorious “Abscam” sting to 
catch government officials involved in these activities.  Abscam involved 
FBI agents posing as representatives of two wealthy sheiks seeking to im-
migrate to the United States.99  The agents offered the legislators money in 
exchange for their promises to introduce private bills on behalf of the ficti-
tious sheiks,100 which some of the congressmen “readily accepted.”101  In 
all, twenty-five people, including one United States Senator, six United 
States Representatives, and other public officials were indicted for corrup-
tion related to the investigation.102  Although most immigration legislation 
                                                          
 91.  Id. at 9. 
 92.  ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 90 (2018). 
 93.  Immigration Bill Probe, 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 237 (1970). 
 94.  Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE 
L.J. 1565, 1574–75 (1982). 
 95.  JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 260 (2017). 
 96.  Id.; Gershman, supra note 94, at 1577–78. 
 97.  Immigration Bill Probe, supra note 93, at 237; Three Branches Involved in Ethics Con-
troversies, 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1021, 1025–26 (1969). 
 98.  United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 479, 484 (1979). 
 99.  Gershman, supra note 94, at 1571–72. 
 100.  United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 692 F.2d 823 
(2d Cir. 1982). 
 101.  Gershman, supra note 94, at 1572. 
 102.  MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL33024, PRIVATE IMMIGRATION 
LEGISLATION 8 (2007) (“Abscam, involving payoffs for the sponsorship of private immigration 
laws, culminated in the expulsion of one Member of the House of Representatives . . . .”).  Cor-
ruption related to private immigration laws has existed since before the ratification of the Consti-
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is surely not the product of bribery, the Abscam scandal, along with other 
instances of bribery related to private bills,103 reveals how the ability of leg-
islatures to enact special legislation creates a marketplace where special 
privileges can be bought and sold. 
Second, even in the absence of bribery, special legislation represents a 
corruption of the legislative process because special benefit legislation is 
enacted disproportionately for the benefit of powerful and politically well-
connected individuals.104  Potential beneficiaries of special laws are moti-
vated to procure special benefit legislation through legal exchanges, like 
campaign contributions.  A potential beneficiary of a special law is likely to 
be more successful at procuring a special bill than the public is at opposing 
it because an individual acting alone incurs no coordination costs and has a 
goal that is simple to explain to legislators.  As Professors John McGinnis 
and Michael Rappaport explained, small but “well-organized . . . groups can 
use their cohesive organizations to influence politicians and the political 
process . . . to extract benefits from the nation.”105  By contrast, although 
the public in general is burdened by special legislation favoring one indi-
vidual, the burden is diffuse, disincentivizing the public from forming a co-
alition to oppose the special legislation.106  Moreover, because of coordina-
tion costs and free riders, it is more costly for large groups to form a 
coalition than small groups; small groups, as a result, “have an advantage in 
the competition for political influence.”107  For example, imagine that 
Company X is seeking a legislatively granted monopoly.  Because the bene-
                                                          
tution.  James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the 
Early Republic, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 388 (2010) (private bills made immigration legislation “more 
prone to corruption”). 
 103.  See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing that a 
legislative aid moved two private bills through the state legislative process in exchange for a 
bribe); United States v. Oaks, 302 F. Supp. 3d 716, 719 (D. Md. 2018) (describing the indictment 
of a state legislator for accepting a bribe in exchange for the introduction of special legislation). 
 104.  Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139, 1153 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter Jack-
son, Veto Message] (arguing that “exclusive privileges . . . make the rich richer and the potent 
more powerful”); THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *393–94 (5th ed. 
1883) (noting that special laws tend to interfere with the principle that the state “has no favors to 
bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights”); Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, 
at 357 (noting that special legislation is prone to provide special favors); Green, supra note 46, at 
363 (recognizing that special legislation strengthens political “machine rule”); Ireland, supra note 
46, at 281, 292; Schutz, supra note 46, at 45; Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State 
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1207–08 (1985). 
 105.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 703, 735–36 (2002).  
 106.  Id. at 737; Andrew McFarland, Interest Group Theory, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 37, 41 (L. Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M. 
Berry eds., 2010) (“[I]n the world of interest group politics . . . the few defeat the many.”). 
 107.  GLENN PARKER, CONGRESS AND THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 30–31 (1996). 
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fit of the special law would be concentrated on Company X, Company X 
would have an incentive to obtain the legislation.  Although granting the 
monopoly to Company X could have a deleterious effect on the public wel-
fare, the burden would be diffuse.  Moreover, the costs of coordinating a 
common, coherent response from the public could be high.  As a result, the 
public is less likely to organize for the purpose of blocking the monopoly 
and a special bill is likely to pass even if it has no public purpose.108 
American history bears out this theory: during the American confeder-
ation period,109 in the first years under the Constitution,110 throughout the 
nineteenth century,111 and still today,112 special legal exemptions and spe-
cial financial benefits unavailable to the general public are often granted by 
legislatures to the politically well-connected.  Take, for example, the well-
known case of Baron von Steuben, who sought and received compensation 
from Congress for debts incurred while fighting for the revolutionary cause 
during America’s War of Independence.113  Although he did incur debt in 
the course of his wartime activities, Congress repaid him “far beyond what 
had been done for the thousands of less prominent Americans who also sac-
rificed for the cause.”114  His special legislation was not procured through 
bribery; nevertheless, von Steuben’s case “was aided immeasurably by his 
status as one of America’s few resident titled aristocrats and as a leader of 
                                                          
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53, 55 (Conn. 1786) (upholding a special law protecting 
one of two partners from liability); RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC 
POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 120 (1979) (describing a gift of stock 
made to George Washington by a special act); Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Pow-
er: Gentility and Lobbying in the Early Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S 57, 
95 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002) (describing that well-connected indi-
viduals are more likely to benefit from special legislation).  
 110.  See Pasley, supra note 109, at 66–67 (describing self-interested lobbying under the new 
Constitution). 
 111.  Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1070 (Ill. 1997) (“[S]pecial legislation 
enriched particular classes of individuals at the expense of others.”); Yeoman v. Commonwealth, 
983 S.W.2d 459, 466 (Ky. 1998) (“[T]he primary driving force behind the adoption of the 1891 
Constitution was the fact that special interests were perceived as having carte blanche with the 
General Assembly to achieve whatever legislation they desired.”); Clean Water Coal. v. M Resort, 
LLC, 255 P.3d 247, 254 (Nev. 2011) (recognizing that constitutional prohibition comes from terri-
torial legislature’s “practice of passing local and special laws for the benefit of individuals”); Har-
risburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1088 (Pa. 2003) (adding a prohibition on special leg-
islation to “put an end to the flood of privileged legislation” (quoting Haverford Twp. v. Siegle, 28 
A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 1942))); Ireland, supra note 46, at 281, 292; Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution 
of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUT. L.J. 1013, 1043–44 (2003) (explaining state pro-
hibitions on special legislation enacted with a “desire to curb special privilege” (quoting JAMES 
WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 241 (1950))). 
 112.  See Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, § 1, 131 Stat. 6, 6 (creating a special exemp-
tion for General James Mattis); Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 
558, 565 (2013) (transferring $174,000 to wife of deceased Senator). 
 113.  Pasley, supra note 109, at 95. 
 114.  Id. 
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both high New York society and the Society of the Cincinnati.”115  Similar-
ly, when the Virginia Assembly purchased stock in George Washington’s 
corporation formed to clear the Potomac River, the Assembly gave Wash-
ington a gift of the corporation’s stock worth $20,000,116 a considerable 
sum at that time.  By contrast, the claims of less prominent citizens were of-
ten ignored during the same period.117 
B.  A Special Legislation Leads to Low-Quality Lawmaking 
A legislature’s ability and willingness to enact special legislation can 
lead to low-quality lawmaking.  Specifically, in jurisdictions in which it is 
common, special legislation clogs the legislative machinery, crowds out 
public-regarding legislation, and fails to provide guidance to the public. 
First, when special legislation is common, it clogs the legislative ma-
chinery,118 compromising the value of deliberation.  Because special legis-
lation concerns particular individuals rather than general policy, individuals 
eagerly seeking special benefits can overwhelm legislatures with bills to 
address the most minute of problems.119  As early as the thirteenth century, 
the English Parliament found itself suffering from an overabundance of pe-
titions for special legislation.120  Before it developed procedures for dealing 
with private petitions,121 Parliament was inundated with so many petitions 
for private bills that it struggled to consider all of them.122  Similarly, colo-
                                                          
 115.  Id. 
 116.  BAILEY, supra note 109, at 120. 
 117.  William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View from the First 
Federal Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S, supra note 109, at 29, 53 (con-
trasting well-connected Americans with ordinary Americans during the confederation period); 
Pasley, supra note 109, at 96 (same). 
 118.  LUCE, supra note 46, at 546. 
 119.  See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1995) (criticizing the confed-
eration-era legislative habit of “extending their deliberations to the cases of individuals”); 
GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7–8 (explaining that “innumerable” special laws “detract greatly 
from the time and attention needed for general legislation”); Green, supra note 46, at 362 (noting 
that special legislation leads to time “wasted on trivial matters”); see also DAVID DEAN, LAW-
MAKING AND SOCIETY IN LATE ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND: THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND, 1584–
1601, at 258 (1996) (noting that there was “never a shortage of people anxious to pursue private 
matters” in Parliament in the 1500s); diGiacomantonio, supra note 117, at 32–33 (noting that ear-
ly Congresses were routinely petitioned by industrial groups for “protectionist” special laws). 
 120.  BAILEY, supra note 109, at 9. 
 121.  Private petitions, requesting private relief, may be distinguished from common petitions, 
which involved questions of public policy.  BAILEY, supra note 109, at 10–11 (describing the 
origin of “common petitions”); GWILYM DODD, JUSTICE AND GRACE: PRIVATE PETITIONING AND 
THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 155 (2007) (distinguishing between pri-
vate and common petitions). 
 122.  BAILEY, supra note 109, at 9 (noting that private petitions occupied a “great deal of . . . 
time” in Parliament); DEAN, supra note 119, at 217 (explaining that local and private legislation 
“took up a good deal of time in every parliamentary session”); DODD, supra note 121, at 155 (de-
scribing how Parliament struggled to find time to devote to private petitions). 
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nial American legislatures were flooded with petitions for special bills; in 
the eighteenth century, they spent most of their time debating private mat-
ters and enacting special legislation.123  After the revolution, early Con-
gresses received “a flood of petitions” that threatened to grind congressional 
business to a halt.124  Like the colonial legislatures, early Congresses spent 
“the principal part” of their time dealing with petitions for special legisla-
tion.125 
This trend continued into the twentieth century; in many years, “Con-
gress enacted more private bills than it did public bills.”126  For example, 
between 1905 and 1907, Congress “enacted more than 6,000 private bills, 
while it enacted fewer than 700 public bills.”127  During this same period, 
most state legislation was special.128  To take just a few of the most egre-
gious examples: ninety-five percent of Pennsylvania’s statutes were spe-
cial;129 in Missouri, eighty-seven percent;130 and more than ninety percent 
each in Kentucky131 and Indiana.132  Similar patterns existed in state legisla-
tures throughout the country.133  Indeed, between 1906 and 1907, state leg-
islatures enacted some twenty-thousand special laws, roughly the same 
amount passed by Great Britain’s Parliament during the entire nineteenth 
century.134 
Because of the time necessary to deal with each bill, an abundance of 
special bills interferes with the ability of legislatures to deliberate, which is 
widely regarded as a normatively attractive goal of the legislative process, 
either instrumentally or as a good in itself.135  An overwhelming number of 
                                                          
 123.  RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD 
BEFORE 1825, at 19–20, 64 (1917) (describing the flood of petitioning that tied up the legislative 
process). 
 124.  diGiacomantonio, supra note 117, at 30. 
 125.  Christine A. Desan, Contesting the Character of the Political Economy in the Early Re-
public: Rights and Remedies in Chisolm v. Georgia, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790s, 
supra note 109, 178, 200–01 (detailing the overwhelming number of petitions in early Congress-
es); Richard R. John & Christopher J. Young, Rites of Passage: Postal Petitioning as a Tool of 
Governance in the Age of Federalism, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790s, supra note 109, 
at 100, 107 (same). 
 126.  JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 75, at 176. 
 127.  Id.; see also LUCE, supra note 46, at 545–46 (describing the large quantity of special laws 
enacted by Congress). 
 128.  LUCE, supra note 46, at 544. 
 129.  Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1088 (Pa. 2003) (recounting levels of 
special legislation in years prior to adopting a constitutional restriction on special legislation). 
 130.  Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 356. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Horack & Welsh, supra note 46, at 192–93. 
 133.  GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 8; Ireland, supra note 46, at 272. 
 134.  LUCE, supra note 46, at 544. 
 135.  Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1665, 1692 (2002) (noting that theorists emphasize, alternatively, the “instrumental value for 
 2019] LEGISLATIVE DESIGN 433 
bills imposes on the deliberative process by making it impossible for the 
legislature to learn much about any of the bills with which it is presented.136  
Early Congresses, unable to investigate petitions for special legislation ade-
quately, often enacted special laws without regard for the merits of the un-
derlying claims.137  The states’ experiences were similar.  Representative of 
the broader mood of the period, members of the 1897 Delaware Constitu-
tional Convention noted “the flood of special bills” that inundated the 
state’s legislature “and the consequent demands upon the time of the Gen-
eral Assembly upon matters with which the members could not be or be-
come familiar.”138  Indeed, nineteenth century state legislation was notable 
for its lack of deliberation for this reason.  When the steady stream of spe-
cial legislation present from the early days of the republic widened into a 
river by the middle of the nineteenth century, the volume of special legisla-
tion prevented state legislators from knowing much more about the bills 
they enacted than the title.139  So many special bills were enacted during 
this period, and with such little deliberation, that legislatures sometimes 
passed duplicate bills a few days apart,140 bills in direct conflict with one 
other,141 and bills responding to requests without any, let alone adequate, 
investigation into their merits.142  Critics noted that this ill-considered spe-
                                                          
good policy” and deliberation’s “intrinsic value to public life”); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving 
and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1288 (2009) (“[R]easoned deliberation should facili-
tate tentative resolutions to specific policy questions that are more widely acceptable to a broader 
range of interests . . . .”); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 959 (1983) (noting the value 
of deliberation in lawmaking); JON ELSTER, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 8 (1998) (describing 
some virtues of deliberation in democracy).  For an argument about the value of deliberation and 
guidance as lawmaking values, see Evan C. Zoldan, Congressional Dysfunction, Public Opinion, 
and the Battle over the Keystone XL Pipeline, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 617, 622–25 (2015).  As 
scholars have noted, Congress does not live up to the ideal of a deliberative body.  See e.g., Ittai 
Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 863 (2010). 
 136.  Wright v. Husbands, 131 A.2d 322, 332–33 (Del. 1957) (describing legislators’ lack of 
knowledge of the merits of special bills). 
 137.  Pasley, supra note 109, at 99 (noting that special laws were enacted, or not, without re-
gard to their merits). 
 138.  Wright, 131 A.2d at 332. 
 139.  Ireland, supra note 46, at 272–73. 
 140.  Id. at 273. 
 141.  Id. at 278 (noting time spent harmonizing “discordant statutes”); Duke Power Co. v. S.C. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 326 S.E.2d 395, 400 (S.C. 1985) (“Recourse to local or special laws often 
results in . . . laws, duplicative or conflicting, on the same subject.”). 
 142.  GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7 (noting that special legislation is passed perfunctorily); 
Green, supra note 46, at 364 (arguing that special legislation is enacted without proper considera-
tion). 
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cial legislation lacked meaningful deliberation,143 calling it “crude,” “care-
less,” “dangerous,” and “trash.”144 
Second, a superabundance of special legislation crowds out general 
legislation addressing problems of public concern.145  In the English Par-
liament, as early as the sixteenth century, petitions for private relief were 
often a substitute for generally applicable laws. When private petitions in-
creased, they competed with generally applicable laws for parliamentary 
time.146  As a result, even as Parliament evolved from a body that largely 
settled private disputes into a national legislature that boldly asserted its au-
thority over state affairs, it found its time taken up by a “multitude of re-
quests” from private petitioners.147  Acting on special laws derived from 
these petitions “occupied so much time in the House of Commons that im-
portant public business was often delayed.”148  Similarly, after the newly 
independent American states began enacting special laws in great numbers, 
James Madison lamented their habit of focusing on particular requests to 
the exclusion of the “comprehensive and permanent interest of the State.”149 
The problem of special legislation occupying time, political capital, 
and energy that reduces the legislature’s ability to address general problems 
only accelerated throughout the nineteenth century.  During this period, 
state legislatures devoted so much time and energy to special legislation 
“that they lacked the time or the attention to enact general laws.”150  Rather 
than focus on problems of general and statewide interest,151 legislators spent 
                                                          
 143.  Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm’n, 175 S.E.2d 805, 816 (S.C. 1970) (noting that 
special legislation lacked deliberation “and the consideration of those problems which make for a 
wise public policy” (quoting Tisdale v. Scarborough, 83 S.E.2d 594, 595 (S.C. 1914))).  
 144.  Ireland, supra note 46, at 272–74. 
 145.  See LUCE, supra note 46, at 542–43 (noting that legislators tend to consider the particular 
at the expense of the general); Comment, Special Legislation Discriminating Against Specified 
Individuals and Groups, 51 YALE L.J. 1358, 1370–71 (1942) [hereinafter Special Legislation Dis-
criminating] (“[B]y occupying themselves with unimportant details of special legislation, legisla-
tive bodies tend to limit their effectiveness in laying down general rules on matters of policy.”). 
 146.  DODD, supra note 121, at 155.  Conversely, as generally applicable laws became more 
prevalent, petitions for private relief decreased.  Id. at 119–20, 135–36. 
 147.  BAILEY, supra note 109, at 12. 
 148.  Id.  The problem of special laws crowding out public-regarding laws may have emerged 
in England by the fourteenth century.  Over the course of the 1300s, petitions once denominated 
as private were instead filed as common petitions, presumably to gain more parliamentary trac-
tion.  By the end of the 1300s, private petitions competed for Parliamentary time with common 
petitions.  DODD, supra note 121, at 155. 
 149.  THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison). 
 150.  Ireland, supra note 46, at 279; see also GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7–8. 
 151.  LUCE, supra note 46, at 541; Schutz, supra note 46, at 59; Special Legislation Discrimi-
nating, supra note 145, at 1370–71; see also Bonney v. Ind. Fin. Auth., 849 N.E.2d 473, 483 (Ind. 
2006) (condemning special legislation “on the ground that attention to local issues diverted the 
legislature from matters of concern to the general public”); Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 356 
(noting the prevalence of “legislative attention being diverted from matters of important public 
concern for frivolity”). 
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their time resolving individual disputes.152  The address convening the 
Michigan constitutional convention is a typical statement of the problem 
faced throughout the country: “The evils of local and special legislation 
have grown to be almost intolerable, . . . consuming the time and energy of 
the legislature which should be devoted to the consideration of measures of 
a general character.”153  Similarly, both before and during his presidency, 
Grover Cleveland railed against special legislation, denouncing state legis-
lators for neglecting the “study and understanding of the important ques-
tions involved in general legislation” because they were focused on the 
flood of special bills they encountered in office.154 
Among other social and economic problems that state legislatures 
failed to address, many states chose to grant endless legislative divorces ra-
ther than reform antiquated divorce laws.  It was not until legislative di-
vorces were prohibited by state constitutional amendments that divorce by 
judicial decree became the norm.155  Similarly, as long as special incorpora-
tion statutes were lawful, they were demanded by seekers of special corpo-
rate privileges and supplied by legislatures.156  The general incorporation 
laws that did exist were a poor substitute for special incorporation laws be-
cause restrictions such as strict director liability made them an unattractive 
alternative to special incorporation statutes.157  It was not until special in-
corporation laws were prohibited by state constitutional amendments did 
states pass effective general incorporation laws.158 
                                                          
 152.  See Mun. City of S. Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ind. 2003) (arguing that spe-
cial legislation “has for years past engaged full three-fourths of the time of the General Assembly, 
to the exclusion (from their due consideration) of many other questions of great importance to the 
people of the State”); Fitzpatrick v. Greater Portland Pub. Dev. Comm’n, 495 A.2d 791, 794 (Me. 
1985) (condemning special legislation for its tendency to “distract the attentions of legislators 
from matters of public interest” (citation omitted)); see also Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 
356–57; Schutz, supra note 46, at 59. 
 153.  Twp. of Casco v. Sec’y of State, 701 N.W.2d 102, 113 (Mich. 2005) (citing 2 
PROCEEDINGS & DEBATES, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1907, at 1422–23). 
 154.  THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 175 (George F. Parker ed., New 
York, Cassell Publ’g Co. 1892). 
 155.  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888) (“During the period of our colonial govern-
ment, for more than one hundred years preceding the Revolution, no divorce took place in the col-
ony of New York, and for many years after New York became an independent state there was not 
any lawful mode of dissolving a marriage in the life time of the parties but by a special act of the 
legislature.”); Ireland, supra note 46, at 289–90; see also LUCE, supra note 46, at 551–52 (describ-
ing the transition from legislative to judicial divorces).  
 156.  LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 512 (1985); Susan Pace Hamill, 
From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of William Hurst’s Study of Corpora-
tions, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 122–24 (1990). 
 157.  Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Cor-
porate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 145–47 (1985); Charles M. Yablon, The Historical 
Race: Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 
J. CORP. L. 324, 331–32, 351–52 (2007). 
 158.  Hamill, supra note 156, at 132. 
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Third, legislative output that consists largely of special laws fails to 
provide citizens with adequate guidance about the conduct that is required 
of them.  General laws, which provide common rules to deal with similar 
situations, offer notice of what the law requires and guidance about how to 
comply with the law.159  Special laws compromise the value of guidance by 
eliminating the coherence that makes law predicable, thereby denying even 
reasonably well-informed citizens the ability “to steer between lawful and 
unlawful conduct.”160  In the early days of the republic, a common source of 
discontent was the fact that special laws failed to provide guidance.  In the 
confederation period, state legislation was criticized for having “been al-
tered—re-altered—made better—made worse; and kept in such a fluctuat-
ing position, that persons in civil commission scarce know what is law, or 
how to regulate their conduct in the determination of causes.”161  Surveying 
the legislative ineptitude of the period, Madison denounced as inequitable 
laws that are “so incoherent that they cannot be understood” or that are “re-
pealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant 
changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it 
will be to-morrow.”162  Special legislation drew the same criticism in the 
nineteenth century, when commentators observed that the proliferation of 
special legislation meant that “no man knows what his rights are, much less 
what they may be.”163  Two cases, identical but for the interposition of a 
special law, would be decided differently, “introducing uncertainty and con-
fusion into the laws.”164  As a result, neither average citizens, nor even law-
yers, could become competent in the law’s requirements.  A prominent 
nineteenth century judge echoed Madison’s lament about special legislation 
when noting that statutes within the city of New York “have been modified, 
superseded and repealed so often and to such an extent that it is difficult to 
ascertain just what statutes are in force at any particular time.”165 
C.  Special Legislation Leads to Unjustifiably Unequal Treatment 
By targeting individuals for special privileges or burdens, special laws 
treat individuals differently in a way that cannot be squared with commonly 
                                                          
 159.  Frank Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 41, 46 (1937) (arguing 
that legislation provides predictability and consistency, much like the common law). 
 160.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 161.  VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 68. 
 162.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison). 
 163.  Ireland, supra note 46, at 278; see also GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 7–8. 
 164.  Twp. of Casco v. Sec’y of State, 701 N.W.2d 102, 113 (Mich. 2005) (citing 2 
PROCEEDINGS & DEBATES, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1907, at 1422–23)); see also supra 
note 152. 
 165.  GUITTEAU, supra note 46, at 8. 
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accepted visions of equality.166  Special legislation offends the anti-
classification conception of equality—associated with formal equality—by 
according privileges or allocating burdens without regard to morally rele-
vant characteristics.167  Consider private immigration bills, like those that 
were the subject of the Abscam sting.  Even though the vast majority of 
special immigration bills are not procured by bribery, and although very 
few are enacted today, all special immigration bills grant their beneficiaries 
special treatment not accorded to other applicants for legal resident sta-
tus.168  Moreover, like other private bills, private immigration bills are 
passed with little or no debate; as a result, members of Congress do not 
even discuss the merits of special immigration bills.169  Because special 
immigration bills accord a benefit without reflecting a reason why one per-
son rather than another was chosen, special immigration bills accord a spe-
cial privilege without regard to any morally relevant characteristic. 
Consider also the example of Terri’s Law, which exempted “any par-
ent” of Terri Schiavo, and no one else, from generally applicable preclusion 
rules.170  Terri’s Law offends the anti-classification conception of equality 
by making a distinction between Schiavo’s parents and others without re-
gard to any morally relevant characteristic.  Each year, countless individuals 
are prevented from relitigating cases previously settled by state court judg-
ments because of generally applicable preclusion rules.171  And although 
Schiavo’s circumstances were unusual, they were not unique: both propo-
nents and opponents of Terri’s Law acknowledged that “thousands of peo-
ple . . . face similar situations” as did Schiavo and her parents.172  By target-
ing Schiavo’s parents alone, and specifically providing that it would not 
“constitute a precedent with respect to future legislation,”173 Terri’s Law 
treated Schiavo’s parents differently than those thousands of similarly situ-
ated individuals without stating a morally relevant difference. 
Special legislation also offends the anti-subordination vision of equali-
ty, a type of substantive equality, by perpetuating social stratification and 
                                                          
 166.  Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 823 (Okla. 1988) (“The vice of special acts is that they 
create preferences and establish inequality.”). 
 167.  See Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 23, at 513. 
 168.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 
(2010). 
 169.  HOW CONGRESS WORKS 85 (5th ed. 2013). 
 170.  Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15, 15–16. 
 171.  28 U.S.C. § 1738; see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (“The federal 
courts generally have also consistently accorded preclusive effect to issues decided by state 
courts.”). 
 172.  151 CONG. REC. S2926, S2928 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2005) (statements of Sen. Tom Harkin 
& Sen. Ron Wyden). 
 173.  § 7, 119 Stat. at 16. 
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reinforcing social hierarchies.174  Members of disfavored political minority 
groups are often the targets of special legal burdens.  During the revolution-
ary period, when political orthodoxy favored revolution, individuals ac-
cused of harboring Tory loyalties, but charged with no crime, were barred 
from practicing their professions,175 suffered the expropriation of their 
property,176 and even, albeit rarely, were sentenced to death177 by special 
bills.  In the twentieth century, again, individuals suspected of heterodox 
political views but not criminal activity were ordered deported178 and de-
nied government salaries179 by special laws.  More recently, individuals 
suspected, but neither charged nor convicted, of violent crimes180 or 
fraud181 have been the target of special laws that stripped them of legal 
rights or government benefits without trial.  In each of these cases, special 
laws perpetuated social and legal hierarchies by penalizing members of 
groups with a disfavored social status or heterodox political beliefs. 
D.  Special Legislation Compromises the Principle of Separation of 
Powers 
 The principle of separation of powers is widely considered a safeguard 
to liberty,182 a predicate of accountable government,183 and a bulwark 
against tyranny.184  When the legislature enacts special legislation, it un-
                                                          
 174.  The anti-subordination conception of equality is concerned with the disestablishment of 
tiers of favored and disfavored individuals.  Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 
23, at 505–06. 
 175.  BAILYN, supra note 26, at 302; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71 
(2001); W.P. Trent, The Case of Josiah Philips, 1 AM. HIS. REV. 444, 454 (1896).  
 176.  E.g., An Act in Addition to an Act Intituled “An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Sundry 
Persons Therein Named,” ch. 8 (1779), in 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 216, 216–18 (Henry Har-
rison Metcalf ed., 1916); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
OF 1787, at 93 (1956); LEVY, supra note 175, at 70–71. 
 177.  E.g., Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788); see also LEVY, supra note 
175, at 71; Matthew Steilen, The Josiah Philips Attainder and the Institutional Structure of the 
American Revolution, 60 HOW. L.J. 413, 427–28 (2017) (describing a Virginia bill attainting Josi-
ah Philips). 
 178.  H.R. 9766, 76th Cong. (1940); Maurice A. Roberts, The Harry Bridges Cases, 
INTERPRETER RELEASES, Sept. 20, 1999, at 1385, 1387. 
 179.  United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305 (1946) (invalidating a statute denying salary to 
specific federal employees). 
 180.  Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1208–09 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 181.  Acorn v. United States, 618 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2010).   
 182.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (noting that separation of powers 
“serves . . . to secure individual liberty”); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Lib-
erty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1539 (1991) (recognizing that the protection of individual rights is 
a “guiding principle” in issues involving separation of powers). 
 183.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742 (stating that separation of powers “serves . . . to make Gov-
ernment accountable”). 
 184.  See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756, (1996) (“Even before the birth of this 
country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”); CHAFETZ, supra note 
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dermines the principle of separation of powers by performing functions as-
signed to the judicial and executive branches.  
 The core of legislative power is to set generally applicable policies that 
are applied by the courts and the executive in particular situations.185  In-
deed, this (admittedly simplified) explanation of separation of powers fol-
lows directly from Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Fletcher v. Peck:186 
“It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for 
the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in 
society would seem to be the duty of other departments.”187  But, although 
the contours of the powers of each of the branches has turned out to be 
more fluid than Chief Justice Marshall suggested,188 “the entire constitu-
tional enterprise depends on there being” lines that separate the branches of 
government.189  Under most any view of the appropriate placement of those 
lines, special legislation compromises the principle of separation of powers. 
First, special legislation violates the principle of separation of powers 
when it is used to decide live controversies by picking the winning and los-
ing parties in particular, pending cases.  In recent years, Congress has bold-
ly asserted the authority to decide pending cases, both between private par-
ties and between the government and private parties.190  In Bank Markazi v. 
Peterson,191 victims of terrorism, and family members and estate represent-
atives of those victims, demonstrated that the republic of Iran was responsi-
ble for injuries and deaths caused by terrorist acts.192  Because their judg-
ments could not be satisfied by assets in the United States,193 the claimants 
brought suit against Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran.  Under the 
                                                          
95, at 310–11 (“The multiple, overlapping, and nonhierarchical authority claims that the American 
constitutional regime fosters help to ensure that no one branch is able to exert tyrannical control 
over the nation.”); Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 329 (2010) (explain-
ing that separation of powers is designed to avoid tyrannical government). 
 185.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1995); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that while the legislature has the power to “prescribe[] the rules by 
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated . . . [t]he interpretation of the laws 
is the proper and peculiar province of the courts”). 
 186.  10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810). 
 187.  Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 
 188.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (noting that the Constitution “enjoins 
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity” (quoting Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))). 
 189.  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1336 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (em-
phasis omitted). 
 190.  Id. at 1317 (upholding a statute, 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2012), that resolved dispute between 
private parties); Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 903 (2018) (upholding an act, Pub. L. No. 113-
179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014), that resolved a dispute between the United States and a private party).  
 191.  136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
 192.  Id. at 1319–20.  
 193.  Id. at 1319–20, 1319 n.5, 1320 n.6. 
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Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,194 however, a central bank could not be 
reached to satisfy existing default judgments against the bank’s home coun-
try.195  To avoid this result, Congress enacted the Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,196 which permitted claims against Iran 
under the FSIA to be satisfied by the assets of Bank Markazi.  Specifically, 
Congress provided that the “financial assets that are identified in . . . Peter-
son et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518” would 
be available “to satisfy any judgment . . . awarded against Iran for damages 
for personal injury or death caused by” acts of terrorism.197  As this lan-
guage of the Iran Threat Reduction statute makes clear, it applied only to 
the particular, pending case against Bank Markazi.   
More recently, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that termi-
nated a particular, pending suit against the United States.  Patchak v. Zin-
ke198 arose from the decision of the United States Department of the Interior 
to take a plot of land, known as the Bradley Property, into trust.  Patchak, 
who owned land near the Bradley Property, brought suit challenging the le-
gality of Interior’s decision.  While the suit was pending, Congress enacted 
a statute that declared Interior’s decision lawful and directed the federal 
courts to dismiss all suits related to the Bradley Property.199  The statutes at 
issue in Bank Markazi and Patchak are not unique; Congress frequently has 
enacted statutes targeted to resolve live disputes,200 including determining 
the outcome of particular pending cases identified in statutory language.201 
Second, special legislation interferes with the judicial process when it 
declares guilt and decides questions concerning legal rights and obligations.  
The most well-known special laws, bills of attainder, assign guilt outside of 
the judicial process.  During the revolutionary period, the newly independ-
ent state legislatures enacted countless bills of attainder.202  These bills, by 
declaring their target guilty and ordering punishment, including banishment 
                                                          
 194.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012). 
 195.  Id. § 1611(b)(1); Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318. 
 196.  22 U.S.C. §§ 8701–8795 (2012).  
 197. Id. § 8772(a)(1)(C), (b). 
 198.  138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). 
 199.  Id. at 903–04 (citing Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 
Stat. 1913 (2014)). 
 200.  Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095, 2095–96 
(2005) (requiring immediate dismissal of pending lawsuits against manufacturers or sellers of 
firearms); New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying the Protec-
tion of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act); Nat’l Coal. to Save our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 
1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding an act, Pub. L. No. 107-11, 115 Stat. 19 (2001), that applied to a 
single location); see Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 23, at 2172 (discussing statutes that direct 
the result in particular, pending cases). 
 201.  Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 433 (1992). 
 202.  Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 23, at 662. 
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or even death, substituted legislative judgment for court determinations 
without indictment, rules of evidence, confrontation of witnesses, juries, or 
even meaningful deliberation.  The revolutionary-era case of Josiah Philips 
is instructive.  When authorities in Virginia were unable to apprehend 
Philips, who was believed to have “commanded an ignorant disorderly 
mob,” the Virginia Assembly attainted Philips of high treason203 after de-
claring that he had “levied war against this commonwealth.”204  And what 
of judicial process? The act attainting Philips was designed specifically to 
avoid it, stating that the statute would obviate “the delays which would at-
tend the proceeding to outlaw the said offenders, according to the usual 
forms and procedures of the courts of law.”205  A decade later, while con-
sidering the Constitution, Patrick Henry, governor at the time of Philips’ at-
tainder, defended the decision.206  Philips, declared Henry, was not entitled 
to “beautiful legal ceremonies” (that is, indictment, a trial, rules of evi-
dence, and confrontation of witnesses against him) because he was popular-
ly known to be “a fugitive murderer and outlaw.”207  Philips was not enti-
tled to legal process, Henry argued, because he had not been “a 
Socrates.”208 
Bills of attainder are largely a thing of the past;209 but other special 
laws, like the statutes considered in Bank Markazi and Patchak, also con-
tinue to assign legal rights and obligations outside of, or in disregard of, the 
judicial process, interfering “in cases where individual rights are concerned, 
and where parties have no opportunity of being properly represented and 
heard.”210  Legislatures enacting special laws have interfered with judicial 
                                                          
 203.  Trent, supra note 175, at 445.  For a recent historical study of the case of Josiah Philips, 
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processes by nullifying judgments already rendered,211 granting new trials 
or extraordinary rights of appeal to losing parties,212 suspending the en-
forcement of judgments,213 clothing particular individuals with civil im-
munity,214 providing immunity for individuals from criminal prosecution,215 
creating special trial procedures directed to specific cases,216 and transfer-
ring title to property between private parties.217 
Third, special legislation also imposes on separation of powers values 
by encroaching on the role of the executive.  When the legislature passes 
generally applicable laws, the executive branch executes these laws by ap-
plying them to particular factual situations.  For example, administrative 
agencies implement generally applicable laws by adjudicating individual 
disputes within their authority.  Similarly, prosecutors bring charges under 
the generally applicable laws—or decline to do so—against specific parties 
for specific conduct.  When the legislature designs a law to target an indi-
vidual, it usurps this role.   
The recent, high-profile battle over the Keystone XL Pipeline illus-
trates special legislation’s intrusion into the role of the executive.  Under 
generally applicable law, when a company applies for a permit to engage in 
cross-border energy-related transactions, administrative agencies must re-
view the pertinent facts and the applicable law to determine whether the 
company is eligible for the permit.218  By contrast, the Keystone XL Pipe-
line Act of 2015,219 which was passed by Congress but ultimately vetoed by 
the President, provided that TransCanada’s application to build a pipeline 
from Canada into the United States was deemed “to fully satisfy” the re-
quirements of “any . . . provision of law that requires Federal agency con-
sultation or review.”220  By singling out a particular company and exempt-
ing it from laws that apply to all other companies, the Keystone legislation 
exempted TransCanada from the process of executive review for compli-
                                                          
 211.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–21(1995); see VERMONT REPORT, 
supra note 25, at 60–70. 
 212.  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219–20; United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404–
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 213.  VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 69. 
 214.  Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53, 53–54 (Conn. 1786); VERMONT REPORT, supra note 
25, at 66.  
 215.  VERMONT REPORT, supra note 25, at 70. 
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other special trial procedures). 
 217.  PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 24, at 41; Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 
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of permits for energy-related facilities engaged in cross-border transactions).  
 219.  S. 1, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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ance with generally applicable laws.221  When it enacts special legislation, 
like the Keystone pipeline measure, Congress impinges on the constitution-
al principle of separation of powers by assuming the power to apply the law 
in derogation of the responsibilities of the executive branch.222 
III.  IN DEFENSE OF SPECIAL LAWS 
Not all special laws lead to all of the costs described above.  Moreo-
ver, some special legislation is an uncontroversial way to deal with prob-
lems that are not or cannot be addressed by generally applicable laws.  Spe-
cifically, special legislation sometimes addresses the needs of particular 
geographic locations, supports a public purpose, cures disuniformities cre-
ated by the generally applicable laws, or provides relief for underrepresent-
ed political minorities. 
A.  Special Laws Can Address Local Problems 
Formal equality suggests that the law should treat two things the same 
only if they are “similarly situated,” that is, if they are the same in a rele-
vant way.223  Special legislation is justified by a formal conception of equal-
ity, therefore, when the subject of the legislation is not similarly situated to 
anything else.  Consistent with this vision of equality, legislatures often en-
act special legislation treating particular geographic locations—like cities, 
counties, or other municipal subdivisions—uniquely;224 this type of legisla-
tion is often called local legislation.225  For example, a law providing a rule 
                                                          
 221.  S. 1; see also Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Keystone XL Pipe-
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but one city in the state to which the act presently applies does not make the act special legisla-
tion.”); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. City of Columbia, 165 S.E.2d 272, 275 (S.C. 1969) (invali-
dating a statutory distinction between cities with 70,000 residents and cities with 90,000 resi-
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 225.  BINNEY, supra note 46, at 24–26; Price v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 331 P.3d 356, 359–
60 (Alaska 2014) (describing a constitutional ban on special or local legislation).  The terminology 
in this area of the law is used inconsistently by courts and commentators.  BINNEY, supra note 46, 
at 21–26; Cloe & Marcus, supra note 46, at 366.  Local laws are sometimes conflated with special 
laws.  See e.g., Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251, 1259 (Ariz. 1990) (in-
validating a statute applying to select cities as “special or local” laws).  Other times, local laws are 
considered neither special nor general.  See, e.g., Weiss, 245 S.W.3d at 152 (distinguishing be-
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for cities of a certain population can be considered local if, in fact, only one 
city in the state has that population.226  Unlike the special laws described 
above, local laws have often been defended on the ground that they address 
issues that are peculiar to the location where they apply.  Every community 
has characteristics that distinguish it from others, including differences in 
wealth, population density, and the need for sanitation, police, and fire ser-
vices.227  Some areas of a state require more paved roads than others; some 
counties have hills that require tunnels, and others have rivers that require 
bridges.  Moreover, different localities may have different preferences 
about how state money should be allocated and how their local govern-
ments should be structured.228  In short, laws addressed to particular politi-
cal subdivisions within the state can be justified by the differences between 
them.  As a corollary, because problems addressed by local laws do not 
concern the entire state, a statewide rule is not appropriate to address a 
uniquely local problem. 
An Arizona case illustrates why commentators229 and courts230 have 
been more sympathetic to local laws than to special laws more generally.  In 
Gallardo v. State,231 a generally applicable law divided the state into com-
munity college districts, each of which was governed by a five-member 
governing board.232  The state amended the generally applicable law by 
adding two members to the governing board of any “county with a popula-
tion of at least three million persons.”233  Although written generally, this 
law had only local effect.  At the time it was written, only one county met 
the population threshold and the court found that no other county was even 
close to reaching it.234  Despite the exclusively local effect, and the state’s 
constitutional prohibition on local laws,235 the court upheld the statute on 
the ground that there was a rational relationship between the size of a coun-
ty and the size of its community college governing board.236  The court not-
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ed that a populous county is likely to have a large student population and, 
therefore, warrant a larger board to govern it.237  Like Gallardo, courts rou-
tinely uphold local laws on the ground that the locality singled out possess-
es unique attributes that justify particularized treatment.238 
B.  A Special Law May Have a General Purpose 
A perennial cost of special legislation is its tendency to avoid prob-
lems of general concern and instead provide exclusive, unearned privileges 
to favored individuals239 or impose undeserved burdens on disfavored indi-
viduals.240  But, sometimes a law tailored to reach an individual has a gen-
eral purpose.  Legislation that is tailored to an individual person, including 
an individual corporation, is often not regarded as special so long as it re-
lates to a matter of general concern.241  Consider a Utah statute enacted to 
avert an emergency threatened by rising water levels in the Great Salt Lake. 
The Great Salt Lake Causeway, a raised bed of landfill that divides the lake, 
prevented the water levels in the separate arms of the lake from equalizing.  
When rising water levels in one arm of the lake threatened to flood adjacent 
land, the owner of the causeway, the Southern Pacific Railway, agreed to 
breach the causeway to prevent further flooding.242  Because breaching the 
causeway would inundate and destroy underwater mining operations that 
were conducted pursuant to a lease with the railway, the state enacted a law 
indemnifying the railway from liability arising from the destruction of the 
leased land.243  The indemnification provision, as the Utah Supreme Court 
later noted, applied only to one piece of land and provided the benefit of in-
demnification for one entity alone.244  Despite the targeted nature of the 
law, the purpose of the law, to mitigate flooding damage, was to advance 
the public interest. 
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Drawing the same distinction between special privileges or burdens 
and, on the other hand, statutes of general concern, courts routinely uphold 
targeted legislation when finding that it addresses matters that touch the 
public interest.  This special legislation includes statutes prohibiting fishing 
in a particular stream,245 reorganizing a particular school district,246 permit-
ting gambling in a particular location,247 granting funds to particular coun-
ties,248 creating a particular public interest corporation,249 and, most fa-
mously, if uniquely, confiscating the papers of former President Nixon.250 
C.  A Special Law May Enhance Rather Than Impair Uniformity 
Special laws are often criticized for creating disuniformity in the 
law,251 which not only introduces unjustifiable inequalities, but also com-
promises the ability of the law to provide notice and guidance.  However, 
not all laws that target particular individuals create or exacerbate disuni-
formity.  First, a targeted statute repealing the special treatment created by a 
special law enhances rather than impairs uniformity.252  A Kansas statute 
illustrates this principle: a generally applicable statute fixed the compensa-
tion of state officers; in derogation of this generally applicable law, the state 
granted a higher rate to probate judges in a particular, named county 
through special legislation.253  A subsequent statute repealed the special 
law, returning the pay structure of the judges to the generally applicable 
rate. This latter statute was challenged as a special law; and indeed, as the 
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court noted, it was special in a sense because it did single out one county’s 
probate judges.  Nevertheless, the court held that the repealing statute was 
“not within the reason or the spirit of the rule against special legislation” 
because it would “reduce the number of counties governed by special acts” 
by subjecting the county, previously governed by a special act, to the gen-
erally applicable law.254  In other words, the court upheld the statute be-
cause it enhanced rather than reduced uniformity by placing the county’s 
probate judges under the rule generally applicable to state officers.  With 
this same goal, some state constitutions explicitly permit special laws en-
acted to repeal other special laws.255 
Second, uniformity is enhanced by a targeted statute that seeks to en-
sure that like situations are treated alike, eliminating disuniformity created 
by the generally applicable laws.256  Laws that seek to cure disuniformity 
created by the general laws are often called “curative” laws and upheld de-
spite their targeted nature.257  In O’Brian v. County Commissioners of Bal-
timore County,258 a typical case upholding a targeted law as curative, a state 
agency awarded a contract to build a particular road pursuant to a generally 
applicable statute.259  While the road was in progress, but before it was 
complete, the legislature repealed the generally applicable law.260  The leg-
islature apparently wanted the road-in-progress to be finished.  Neverthe-
less, because the state legislature did not provide a savings clause in its re-
pealer statute, no state agency had the authority to pay for the completion of 
the road.  In order to correct this oversight, the legislature enacted a new 
statute, naming the road-in-progress and authorizing payment for its com-
pletion.261  The law was challenged as prohibited special legislation.  The 
court upheld the statute, noting that the targeted statute was intended to be 
“curative”; that is, it was intended to remedy the mischief created by the re-
peal of the generally applicable road authorization law without providing 
for the completion of roads-in-progress.262  As a result, the statute was not 
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prohibited as a special law.263  The statute in O’Brian, although targeted to 
a specific road, did not create disuniformity.  Rather, the statute arguably 
encouraged uniformity by ensuring that the contractor who had contracted 
with the state to build the road would be treated like all previous contractors 
with the state; that is, he would be paid for his work.264 
Third, a statute that changes the law for a known individual may en-
hance uniformity if it also serves as a model for future cases.  A legislature 
sometimes enacts a statute to govern future behavior that also applies to be-
havior that already has occurred.  This is often the case when, in response to 
a particular event, the legislature passes a statute that addresses both that 
particular event and anticipated future conduct.  If this new statute applies 
prospectively only, it would create disuniformity between future cases and 
the pending case that prompted the legislative response.  However, if it ap-
plies retrospectively to include the pending case that prompted the change 
in law, it would apply uniformly to pending and future cases.  Notably, the 
first Congress enacted a number of statutes that created a rule encompassing 
both named individuals and similar potential future cases.  For example, 
Congress granted death benefits to a particular, named widow and orphan 
of soldiers killed during the Revolutionary War.265  In the same statute, 
Congress also provided that “the widow or orphan of each officer, non-
commissioned officer, or soldier, who was killed or died whilst in the ser-
vice of the United States” was entitled to a pension on the same terms as 
provided to the named beneficiaries.266  Although the statute singled out 
beneficiaries by name, the statute did not impair uniformity; instead, it en-
sured that there would be uniformity between the current, named beneficiar-
ies and any similar beneficiaries that come into existence in the future.267 
D.  Special Laws Can Provide Relief for Underrepresented Individuals 
While special benefit legislation concentrates benefits on a single indi-
vidual, the corresponding costs tend to be diffused throughout a large, dis-
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organized, heterogeneous group.  As a result, even if a special law lacks 
powerful supporters, opposition to special legislation tends to be weak.268  It 
is precisely because opposition to special benefit legislation tends to be 
weak that it can be promoted successfully not only to aggrandize the 
wealthy and well-connected,269 but also to provide relief for political minor-
ities who are unrepresented in, or excluded from, the political process.270  In 
colonial Virginia, the General Assembly would consider petitions for spe-
cial bills not only from the wealthy and well-connected, but also from 
women, the poor, prisoners, free blacks, and even slaves.271  The General 
Assembly’s willingness to consider and occasionally enact special bills for 
individuals who could not vote or hold political office was a strikingly 
democratic feature in an otherwise hierarchical society.  Indeed, social rank 
did not seem to influence whether the General Assembly enacted a special 
bill in response to a petition.272  In one notable example, a group of free 
black men successfully petitioned for an exemption from certain taxes.273 
A modern analog is special immigration legislation.  Congress has en-
acted more than 7,000 special immigration bills,274 the vast majority of 
which provided relief for individuals who were not politically well-
connected.  Historically, most private immigration bills have been enacted 
for otherwise underprivileged individuals, like orphans adopted by citizens 
of the United States, war brides and children of United States servicemen, 
and displaced persons or refugees.275  Special immigration legislation pro-
cured by bribery for the benefit of the politically well-connected276 is the 
exception to this general pattern. 
IV.  A BETTER APPROACH TO SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
In light of the foregoing, it would be hasty to characterize special leg-
islation as uniformly beneficial or costly.  It can impose significant costs on 
society, to be sure; but, in other circumstances, it can also provide benefits.  
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As a result, neither a blanket prohibition on special legislation nor a blind 
eye toward it is likely to produce optimal societal results.  Instead, it is 
preferable to attempt to formulate rules to govern the enactment of special 
legislation that will reduce its costs without completely eliminating its ben-
efits.277  This Part advocates a better approach to special legislation by pro-
posing legislative procedures designed to discourage costly special legisla-
tion without eliminating its benefits.  Both the chambers of Congress278 and 
the chambers of state legislatures279 have the power to adopt the changes 
proposed in this Part under their power to write rules governing their pro-
ceedings.  As a result, the proposals in this Part are addressed to legisla-
tures—both state legislatures and Congress—rather than to courts. 
A.  Three Caveats Before Suggesting Legislative Modifications 
Before I suggest how legislatures can modify their internal rules, three 
caveats are in order.  First, by proposing changes to legislative rules, I 
acknowledge that the enforcement of these proposals relies on the willing-
ness of legislative chambers to adopt these restrictions and enforce them in 
particular cases.  I am optimistic that legislatures would be willing to adopt 
and adhere to rules related to special legislation because the chambers of 
Congress already have adopted rules related to private legislation (a subset 
of special legislation) and earmarks (a close analog of special legislation), 
have generally observed these rules, and have adopted a mechanism for re-
solving difficult questions about their application. 
House and Senate rules prohibit either chamber from considering pri-
vate bills in certain circumstances280 and restrict their consideration in oth-
                                                          
 277.  For an argument that prohibitions on special legislation should be understood to help 
eliminate costly logrolling, see Gillette, supra note 46, at 642. 
 278.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”); 
see also JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 588 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873) (“No person can doubt the propriety of the provision 
authorizing each house to determine the rules of its own proceedings.  If the power did not exist, it 
would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with 
decency, deliberation, and order.”). 
 279.  State constitutions have provisions that mirror the federal Constitution’s rules of proceed-
ings clause.  E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 53 (“Each house shall have power to determine the rules 
of its proceedings . . . .”); ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 12 (“The houses of each legislature shall 
adopt uniform rules of procedure.”); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a) (“Each house shall . . . adopt 
rules for its proceedings.”).  Moreover, even in the absence of an express constitutional grant, state 
legislatures would have the power to write their own rules of procedure.  H. W. Dodds & John A. 
Lapp, Procedure in State Legislatures, 77 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. (SUPP.) 1, 12–13 
(1918); see also CHAFETZ, supra note 95, at 277–78 (describing colonial and early state legisla-
tive sources of authority to write procedural rules). 
 280.  RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XII, cl. 4, at 25 (2019); STANDING 
RULES FOR THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XIV, cl. 10, at 10 (2013). 
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ers.281  Despite the fact that both chambers frequently pass special legisla-
tion that is not covered by their rules, they have consistently refused even to 
consider private legislation when doing so would violate chamber rules.282  
For example, both House and Senate rules specifically prohibit the correc-
tion of military records by private bill.283  When a private bill was intro-
duced in the Senate to alter the military records of a particular former ser-
viceman, the presiding officer sustained a point of order lodged against 
consideration of the bill, ruling that the prohibition was intended “to put a 
definite termination to the introduction of private bills for the correction of 
military records.”284  As a result, he ruled, “the bill proposed by the able 
Senator cannot be received.”285  Similarly, points of order have been sus-
tained against amendments to private bills because they would have violat-
ed chamber rules, including amendments that were not germane,286 imper-
missibly general,287 and pro forma.288 
Similarly, both chambers of Congress have adopted restrictions on 
earmarks.289  There has been a great deal of debate concerning whether the 
reduction of earmarks has reduced federal spending or, instead, whether di-
rected spending still happens in more informal ways, such as through “let-
termarking.”290  Although the debate is still ongoing, initial political science 
                                                          
 281.  E.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XV, cl. 5, at 29 (setting rules for 
consideration of bills on the private calendar). 
 282.  7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 22, §§ 11.10, 13.7–.8, at 4497, 
4505–06 (1994); 7 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS, ch. CCXII, § 860, at 69–70 (1936).  A special thanks 
to Christopher Davis for helping me think through this issue. 
 283.  RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XII, cl. 4, at 25; STANDING RULES OF 
THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XIV, cl. 10, at 10. 
 284.  93 CONG. REC. 905 (1947). 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 22, §§ 13.7–.8, at 4505–06. 
 287.  7 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS, ch. CCXII, § 860, at 69–70; 7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 22, § 13.8, at 4506. 
 288.  7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 22, § 13.16, at 4510; see also 
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 75, at 178, 719 (noting that private bills have been recommitted when 
two members object to its consideration); 7 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, ch. 
22, § 11.10, at 4497 (noting that private bills called up on the wrong day have been ruled ineligi-
ble for consideration). 
 289.  RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XXI, cl. 9, at 36 (2019); STANDING 
RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XLIV, cl. 6, at 69 (2013).  In addition to these 
formal restrictions, caucuses within each chamber have adopted informal policies to refrain from 
requesting earmarks.  See, e.g., HISTORY, RULES & PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN 
CONFERENCE  10 (2014), https://www.republican.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/65589e31-c184-
4c95-9947-770f1b3998c1/A669DDFC6A0CAF777199282DC623467F.conference-rules-2015.pdf 
(“[I]t is the policy of the Republican Conference that no Member shall request a congressionally 
directed spending item . . . .”). 
 290.  Lettermarking is a communication by a member of Congress to an administrative agency 
official requesting the specific direction of otherwise non-directed appropriations to a particular 
constituency.  Jacob R. Neiheisel & Michael C. Brady, Congressional Lettermarks, Ideology, and 
Member Receipt of Stimulus Awards from the Department of Labor, RES. & POL., July–Sept. 
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and economics research suggests that Congress generally has adhered to its 
restrictions on earmarks and that the restrictions have reduced targeted 
spending.291 
Enforcing restrictions on special legislation in each legislative cham-
ber will be made easier by the presence of professional legislative personnel 
dedicated to the neutral resolution of difficult questions of procedure.  The 
House of Representatives and the Senate, for example, each have a Parlia-
mentarian who provides expert, nonpartisan advice about legislative proce-
dure based on precedent.292  If either chamber were to adopt rules about 
special legislation, the Parliamentarian would be able to help resolve, in a 
nonpartisan manner, questions that arise over whether a particular bill is 
special. 
Because the chambers of Congress have adopted rules on private legis-
lation and earmarks, have adhered to these self-imposed restrictions, and 
have adopted a mechanism for resolving legislative disputes in light of 
precedent, it is likely that the proposals in this Part, if adopted, can con-
strain legislative behavior even though they are not enforceable like consti-
tutional requirements.293 
Second, it is probably not possible to quantify all of the costs and ben-
efits associated with many special laws.  Consider, for example, the special 
law resolving the ongoing litigation in Bank Markazi.  Recall that the spe-
cial law deemed the assets of the central bank of Iran to be the assets of the 
country of Iran for the purpose of a single consolidated case, resulting in the 
satisfaction of judgments for victims of terrorism.294  From an accounting 
perspective, the special law that allows the satisfaction of nearly $2 billion 
in judgments creates neither a cost nor a benefit, but rather is better charac-
terized as a transfer payment.295  From the perspective of the claimants, 
                                                          
2017, at 1, 5 (finding that the efficacy of lettermarking is limited); Jacob Dawson & Sam Kleiner, 
Curbing Lettermarks, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 201, 202 (2015). 
 291.  Steven Gordon, What Did the Earmark Ban Do? Evidence from Intergovernmental 
Grants, 48 J. REGIONAL ANALYSIS & POL’Y, 20, 37 (2018) (finding that earmark restrictions 
“may have helped to reverse the trend of increasing grant levels”); Neiheisel & Brady, supra note 
290, at 5 (“[M]ost legislators do not appear to have benefitted from writing lettermarks to the bu-
reaucracy.”). 
 292.  JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 75, at iii. 
 293.  Similarly, the British Parliament adheres to its rules for considering private bills. See 
MAY, supra note 52, at 830, 835–37 (noting that private bills may not proceed when the process 
for considering them is defective); see also Anita Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A 
Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 16–17 (2009) (argu-
ing that framework statutes, although are not binding, tend to be followed by legislature). 
 294.  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1319–20 (2016). 
 295.  E.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-4, at 38 (2003), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (“Transfer pay-
ments are monetary payments from one group to another that do not affect total resources availa-
ble to society.”). 
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however, this special law resulted not only in quantifiable judgments, but 
also in the unquantifiable benefit of resolving legal disputes that began dec-
ades earlier.  But, the statute created costs as well.  The Bank Markazi deci-
sion itself has led to follow-on litigation that is still ongoing, both in the 
United States and in the International Court of Justice.296  Perhaps more im-
portantly, and impossible to quantify, Bank Markazi’s special law arguably 
undermines the financial and diplomatic stability achieved by having a co-
herent and predictable policy toward foreign countries and their central 
banks.  Because it is not possible to fully quantify the costs and benefits of 
many special laws, there may not always be agreement about whether the 
elimination of a particular special law is normatively attractive. 
Third, the proposals in this Part draw inspiration from the practices of 
state legislatures,297 Congress,298 federal administrative agencies,299 and the 
Parliament of Great Britain.300  Although I argue that the proposals are 
normatively attractive, I do not suggest that these practices are binding as a 
matter of constitutional law. 
With these caveats in mind, legislatures should consider one or more 
of the following procedural requirements to reduce the costs of special leg-
islation: a rule requiring that special legislation may be enacted only by a 
legislative supermajority; a rule requiring public notice and providing an 
opportunity for public participation before special legislation is enacted; 
and a rule prohibiting special legislation unless it is accompanied by an of-
ficial statement of the law’s purpose. 
B.  A Legislative Supermajority Requirement 
1.  Models for a Legislative Supermajority Requirement 
Federal lawmaking sometimes requires a legislative supermajority.301  
Consider just a few examples from the Constitution: a supermajority of the 
                                                          
 296.  See Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, ¶ 13 (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/164/164-20190213-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf; Peterson v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 876 F.3d 63 (2017). 
 297.  E.g., DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19 (requiring supermajority approval before enacting special 
legislation); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 32 (requiring publication of the contents of a proposed spe-
cial bill). 
 298.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (2012) (describing the congressional reference case process); 
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, r. XII, cl. 4, at 25 (2019) (prohibiting certain types 
of private laws). 
 299.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring notice and comment rulemaking process); Chocolate 
Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985) (describing the obligations 
of an agency during the notice and comment process). 
 300.  See generally DODD, supra note 121 (describing the practice of private petitioning of Par-
liament); MAY, supra note 52, at 824. 
 301.  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 105, at 710–12. 
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Senate is required for the approval of treaties; and a supermajority of both 
chambers of Congress is required to override a veto and, when initiated by 
Congress, to propose amendments to the Constitution.302  Outside of the 
Constitution, legislative rules have developed to require supermajority sup-
port before legislation can be enacted.  Most famously, the Senate’s cham-
ber rules effectively require a supermajority for most legislation by permit-
ting a minority to block it, a tactic known as the filibuster.303 
Some state legislatures also abide by supermajority requirements for 
lawmaking, including both constitutional rules and internal provisions akin 
to the Senate’s supermajority cloture rule.304  Most notably, a number of 
state constitutions require supermajority approval by the legislature before 
special legislation may be enacted.305  Delaware’s constitution is typical: it 
permits certain types of special laws, but only provided that two-thirds of 
each chamber of its legislature approves the special law.306  In all of these 
examples—the federal Constitution, state constitutions, and the filibuster—
the effect is to slow down the legislative process and screen out minimally 
supported laws.307 
2.  A Legislative Supermajority Requirement Will Reduce the Cost 
of Special Legislation 
A legislature can reduce the costs associated with special legislation by 
enacting it only by a supermajority.  A supermajority requirement will re-
duce the costs of special legislation in three ways: first, by reducing all spe-
cial legislation, freeing up legislative time for matters of public concern; 
second, by reducing harmful special legislation particularly well; and third, 
                                                          
 302.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (requiring the consent of a supermajority of the Senate to make 
treaties); id. art. I, § 7 (requiring a supermajority of both chambers of Congress to override a veto); 
id. art. V (requiring a supermajority of both chambers of Congress to propose amendments). 
 303.  STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XXII, at 15–17 (2013); 
GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE 
U.S. SENATE 6–7 (2006) (describing the importance of the filibuster to Senate procedure). 
 304.  E.g., ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE UNIFORM RULES, r. 32(a), at 16 (2018) (“The previ-
ous question upon all recognized motions or amendments which are debatable may be ordered by 
a two-thirds vote of the members present.  If ordered, the previous question has the effect of cut-
ting off all debate . . . .”); see also PERMANENT RULES OF THE VERMONT SENATE, r. 55, at 12 
(2016) (“A call for the previous question shall not at any time be in order.”). 
 305.  DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19; IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 29; N.J. 
CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 10. 
 306.  DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19; Smith v. Balt. & Ohio. R.R., 85 A.2d 73, 75 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1951) (“Having failed to pass both Houses of the Legislature by the required two-third vote of all 
the members it must be declared invalid.”). 
 307.  CHAFETZ, supra note 95, at 296 (describing the screening function of the Senate filibus-
ter); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 105, at 788 n.359 (describing effects of constitutional 
supermajority provisions). 
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by failing to reduce beneficial special legislation as thoroughly as it reduces 
costly special legislation. 
First, a supermajority requirement for special legislation will reduce all 
special legislation.  As compared with a simple majority, a supermajority 
requirement demands that a greater percentage of legislators agree to a bill 
before it becomes law.308  The increased cost (including time, money, and 
political capital) that a proponent of special legislation encounters should 
lower the demand for special legislation, reducing the likelihood that spe-
cial legislation will be passed.  As a result, a supermajority requirement for 
the enactment of special legislation encourages the persistence of the status 
quo.309  Commentators have observed that supermajority requirements im-
pede the passage of bills in the United States Senate, which, because of its 
chamber rules, permits a minority to block legislation.  Professor Josh 
Chafetz has noted that the use of the filibuster in the Senate means that 
“many measures with broad and deep support” fail to pass because they 
earn “the support of fewer than sixty senators.”310 
Because a supermajority requirement will reduce both beneficial and 
costly special legislation, without knowing the details of a particular pro-
posed special law, it is impossible to say whether it will be beneficial or 
harmful to reduce its viability through a supermajority requirement.311  
Nevertheless, the reduction of special legislation in general is normatively 
attractive in itself because of the costs created by excessive amounts of spe-
cial legislation.  As noted above, an abundance of special legislation can 
push public-regarding laws from the legislative agenda.312  The reduction of 
special legislation precipitated by a supermajority requirement would help 
clear the legislative docket of special legislation that is likely to attract only 
a simple majority.  Also, because legislators know that promoting legisla-
tion is relatively costly when it requires supermajority support,313 a super-
majority requirement could also reduce costs by encouraging legislators to 
spend less time promoting special laws. 
Second, a supermajority requirement would reduce special legislation 
in a normatively attractive way because it would be particularly successful 
at reducing the costs associated with special legislation described above, in-
cluding corruption and a lack of deliberation.  Supermajority requirements 
would reduce the likelihood that special legislation is enacted without de-
                                                          
 308.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional So-
lution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 403–04 (1999). 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  CHAFETZ, supra note 95, at 296–97. 
 311.  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 105, at 742 (arguing that supermajority rules are 
attractive if baseline rules are attractive). 
 312.  See supra Section II.B. 
 313.  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 105, at 745. 
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liberation.  As noted above, special legislation both tends to be under-
deliberated and also places excessive demands on the legislative agenda 
more generally.314  A supermajority requirement for special legislation (like 
all supermajority requirements) can encourage deliberation by making each 
legislative vote to secure the passage of a law more valuable.  Because each 
vote is more valuable, legislators advocating a special bill will have to per-
suade more colleagues of its merits.  Increasing the number of interactions 
that must take place among legislators before a law is enacted will promote 
the deliberation that accompanies discussion and debate.315  The goal of en-
hancing the deliberative process has prompted a number of states to require 
their legislatures to enact special laws only with a supermajority of two-
thirds.316  The Delaware Supreme Court, for example, noted that its super-
majority requirement for special legislation was driven by the “flood of 
special bills” that inundated the state’s legislature “and the consequent de-
mands upon the time of the General Assembly.”317 
Similarly, supermajority rules would likely be good at reducing special 
legislation that reflects the corruption of the legislative process, either be-
cause of overt bribery or because it is enacted for the benefit of powerful 
and politically well-connected individuals rather than for the benefit of the 
public.318  By slowing down the legislative process and making each vote 
more valuable, a supermajority requirement would expose legislators’ deci-
sions to public scrutiny, which would help reveal whether the decision to 
support a bill was corrupt.319  A supermajority provision would also reduce 
special legislation that inures to the benefit of the politically well-connected 
by raising the cost of procuring legislative support.  The greater the number 
of legislators that must agree to enact a special law, the more it will cost to 
procure their support.  A special law that provides private rather than public 
                                                          
 314.  See supra Section II.B. 
 315.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Super-
majority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 497 (1995) (describing the connection be-
tween debate and deliberation); Staszewski, supra note 135, at 1287–88 (describing benefits of 
discussion and debate). 
 316.  DEL. CONST. art. II, § 19; IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 29; N.J. 
CONST. art. 4, § 7, ¶ 10. 
 317.  Wright v. Husbands, 131 A.2d 322, 332 (Del. 1957). 
 318.  See Clean Water Coal. v. M Resort, LLC, 255 P.3d 247, 254 (Nev. 2011) (criticizing the 
legislature for enacting “special laws for the benefit of individuals instead of enacting laws of a 
general nature for the benefit of the public welfare” (quoting Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, 333 
(1873))). 
 319.  Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Transparency and Corruption, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPARENCY 334 (Jens Forssbaeck & Lars Oxelheim eds., 
2015) (“Transparency can help reduce corruption by exposing the corrupt relationships to public 
opprobrium . . . .”); Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal 
Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 
928 (2009) (noting that transparency encourages the public to “pull the alarm on . . . corruption”). 
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benefits would be attractive to fewer legislators than a law with public ben-
efits, all else being equal, because fewer legislators would have an incentive 
to create a privilege for the special law’s beneficiary.  As a result, the pro-
ponent of a special law would have to spend more to procure support of leg-
islators who otherwise would have no incentive to enact special legislation 
without a public benefit.  The increased cost of procuring special laws with 
only private benefit would will reduce the demand for them. 
Third, although a supermajority requirement would be particularly 
successful at reducing the costs of special legislation noted above, it is less 
likely to impede special legislation enacted for a public purpose or special 
legislation addressing unique circumstances.  Even if special, legislation 
that is enacted for a public purpose or to address a unique circumstance 
would have broad support and, as a result, could be enacted despite the in-
creased difficulty in obtaining a supermajority.  Consider, again, the Utah 
indemnity law that encouraged a railway to breach the Great Salt Lake 
Causeway, averting disaster.320  Despite the fact that the law was special, 
the flooding was a unique circumstance that could not quickly be addressed 
by generally applicable law.  Moreover, the purpose of the law, to mitigate 
flooding damage, was in the public interest.  Because of the urgency of the 
situation, and because of the importance of the special law, it is likely that 
an indemnification law like this one would be so popular that it would gar-
ner not only majority, but supermajority, support. 
C.  Notice and an Opportunity to Participate 
A legislature can reduce the costs of special legislation by requiring 
public notice before it acts on special legislation.  Notice of a law, after it is 
enacted, serves the important purpose of providing individuals with 
knowledge of the conduct that society prohibits.  A person who does not 
have notice of what conduct is unlawful is not “free to steer between lawful 
and unlawful conduct.”321  But, providing notice of a proposed law before it 
is enacted serves a different purpose.  A person who is notified that a law-
making body is considering creating a law has the opportunity to participate 
in the lawmaking process to some degree, either by opposing the proposed 
law322 or influencing its final shape.323 
                                                          
 320.  Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 623 (Utah 1990). 
 321.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 322.  Burnett v. Chilton Cty. Health Care Auth., No. 1160958, 2018 WL 4177518, at *6 (Ala. 
Aug. 31, 2018) (opining that the notice requirement for special legislation was intended to provide 
opponents “a fair opportunity to protest against and oppose its enactment” (quoting Wallace v. Bd. 
of Revenue, 37 So. 321, 323 (Ala. 1904))); Deputy Sheriffs Law Enf’t Ass’n of Mobile Cty., v. 
Mobile Cty., 590 So. 2d 239, 241 (Ala. 1991) (opining that the purpose of the notice provision “is 
to inform all persons affected by the local law, thus giving them an opportunity to voice their op-
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1.  Models of Notice and Participation 
There is no formal mechanism for public participation in the federal 
process of statutory creation.324  Indeed, Congress is not required to give 
public notice that it is considering legislation before it enacts it.  Nor is 
Congress required to hold hearings on proposed legislation or to take public 
views before enacting legislation.325  And, although Congress often does 
gather information before enacting legislation, which can help it decide 
whether to legislate, and what legislation should include,326 congressional 
hearings are held at the discretion of Congress, or its individual chambers or 
committees, and cannot be required by the public or ordered by a court.327  
The centrality of lobbying to the federal legislative process is a testament to 
the fact that the formulation of statutory language is done outside of the 
public eye.328  Even the tangled vines of rules that have grown up around 
lobbying do little to make lobbyist influence on members of Congress 
transparent to the public.329 
Outside of the federal process of statutory formulation, however, it is 
easy to find models of robust public participation in lawmaking.  Public 
participation, for example, is an integral and well-known part of the federal 
rulemaking process.  With some exceptions, federal agencies must provide 
public notice before they promulgate rules.330  The notice alerts the public 
to the subject of the proposed rulemaking and, in practice, normally in-
                                                          
position”); BAILEY, supra note 109, at 31 (explaining that colonial legislative committees would 
consider counter-petitions before determining the facts relevant to a special bill). 
 323.  Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985) (opining 
that the purpose of the notice and comment procedure is “to allow the agency to benefit from the 
experience and input of the parties who file comments . . . and to see to it that the agency main-
tains a flexible and open-minded attitude towards its own rules” (quoting Nat’l Tour Brokers 
Ass’n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978))); accord BAILEY, supra note 109, at 
75 (noting that colonial legislative committees would sometimes decline to enact a special bill 
because of public opposition). 
 324.  Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What Ameri-
ca Can Learn from Europe, and Vice-Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645, 654–55 (2006) (“In for-
mal terms legislative proposals come only from legislators.”). 
 325.  Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing exclusive lawmaking prerequisites). 
 326.  James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 44 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1115, 1122 (2007). 
 327.  E.g., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC NO. 113-18, r. XXVI, cl. 1, at 31 (2013) 
(authorizing standing committees and subcommittees to hold hearings authorized by Senate reso-
lution). 
 328.  Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 
202 (2012) (noting that lobbying rules do not require lobbyists to disclose activities with a great 
level of detail). 
 329.  Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to 
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 520 (2007) (arguing that it is difficult even for a 
“watchful public citizen” to know how lobbyist behavior influences bill language). 
 330.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (setting out notice and comment rulemaking procedures for federal 
agencies).  There are exceptions to the notice requirement that I will not discuss here. 
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cludes the text of the proposed rule itself.331  The notice also provides in-
structions for public participation, including a time limit for interested 
members of the public to submit comments, including “written data, views, 
or arguments” for the agency to consider.332 
The notice and opportunity to comment provided during rulemaking is 
designed to allow public views to influence agency decision-making.333  As 
described by a number of the United States courts of appeals, the purpose of 
notice and comment procedures is to “allow the agency to benefit from the 
experience and input of the parties who file comments . . . and to see to it 
that the agency maintains a flexible and open-minded attitude towards its 
own rules.”334  Put in a more adversarial tone, but reflecting the same idea, 
it has been observed that “public participation requirements . . . force une-
lected bureaucrats to consider the public interest in the formulation of fed-
eral regulations.”335  In order to achieve this goal, federal agencies may not 
simply ignore public comments.  Indeed, when finalizing a proposed rule, 
an agency is required to publish responses to “significant” public com-
ments, which puts pressure on the agency to explain its decision-making 
process.336  And, as scholars have argued, agencies “do take comments se-
riously and often modify the final rule” because of comments submitted.337 
                                                          
 331.  WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE & PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND 
CASES 96–97 (4th ed. 2010). 
 332.  5 U.S.C. § 553(c).  Although the vast majority of rulemakings attract fewer than 100 
comments, a small percentage of proposed rules receive thousands of comments or more.  STEVEN 
J. BALLA, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PUBLIC COMMENTING ON FEDERAL AGENCY 
REGULATIONS: RESEARCH ON CURRENT PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 25–26 (2011).  The recent net neutrality 
rulemaking, in which 27 million comments were received (many of which were undoubtedly inau-
thentic), is unusual.  PAUL HITLIN & SKYE TOOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC COMMENTS TO 
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ABOUT NET NEUTRALITY CONTAIN MANY 
INACCURACIES AND DUPLICATES (2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/11/29/public-
comments-to-the-federal-communications-commission-about-net-neutrality-contain-many-
inaccuracies-and-duplicates/. 
 333.  JEFFREY LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 271–72 (5th ed. 2012) 
(“[T]here is little question that agencies must and do take comments seriously and often modify 
the final rule” because of submitted comments.). 
 334.  Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
Nat’l Tour Brokers Ass’n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
 335.  Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Partici-
pates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 246 (1998). 
 336.  Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (“An agency must consider 
and respond to significant comments received during the period for public comment.”); Am. Min-
ing Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that significant comments are 
“those which raise relevant points and which, if adopted, would require a change in the agency’s 
proposed rule”). 
 337.  LUBBERS, supra note 333, at 272; BALLA, supra note 332, at 35 (“There is little doubt 
that comments at times exert fundamental influence over agency decision making.”). 
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It is also possible to find examples of notice and public participation in 
state rulemaking and legislative processes.  Like their federal counterpart, 
state legislatures have enacted agency rulemaking procedures, most of 
which are at least as elaborate as the federal process described above.338  
Most relevantly, a number of states prohibit special legislation unless notice 
of the proposed special law is published in advance of its enactment.339  In 
these states, notice: must be given for an extended period—typically a full 
month—before the legislative vote takes place;340 must include not only the 
title, but also the contents, of the bill;341 and, in the case of a local law, must 
be published in the location that will be affected by the proposed statute.342  
When states require notice in advance of the introduction or passage of a 
proposed special law, it is typically for the same reasons as the notice and 
comment process employed for federal regulations, that is, to influence its 
final shape or oppose it.343  As one state court described, the purpose of its 
notice requirement for special legislation “is to inform all those affected . . . 
of the proposed legislation to the end that they have an opportunity to op-
pose such legislation if they deem it unwise.”344 
State legislative rules requiring notice and an opportunity for participa-
tion in advance of the enactment of special legislation have a long pedigree.  
Since the middle ages, Parliament has treated the private bill process like a 
contested proceeding in a court of justice.345  Still today, the House of 
                                                          
 338.  Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012), with REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT 
art. 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
 339.  ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 106 (providing that special laws are void unless public notice is 
provided in advance); LA. CONST. art. 3, § 13 (same); MO. CONST. art. 3, § 42 (same); N.J. 
CONST. art. 4, § 7, ¶ 8 (same); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 32 (same); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 57 (same). 
 340.  ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 106 (requiring publication for four weeks prior to introduction 
into the legislature); LA. CONST. art. 3, § 13 (requiring publication for thirty days before a special 
law can be enacted); MO. CONST. art. 3, § 42 (requiring thirty days’ notice before bill can be in-
troduced into the legislature); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 32 (requiring four weeks’ notice before 
consideration by the legislature); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 57 (same). 
 341.  ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 106 (requiring publication of the contents of a proposed special 
bill); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 32 (same); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 57 (same). 
 342.  LA. CONST. art. 3, § 13 (requiring publication in the locality affected by the proposed 
bill); MO. CONST. art. 3, § 42 (same); TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 57 (same). 
 343.  Burnett v. Chilton Cty. Health Care Auth., No. 1160958, 2018 WL 4177518, at *6 (Ala. 
Aug. 31, 2018) (holding that the notice requirement for special legislation was intended to provide 
opponents “a fair opportunity to protest against and oppose its enactment” (quoting Wallace v. Bd. 
of Revenue, 37 So. 321, 323 (Ala. 1904))). 
 344.  Adam v. Shelby Cty. Comm’n, 415 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Wilkins v. 
Woolf, 208 So. 2d 74, 74 (Ala. 1968)); see also State v. Ward, 118 P.2d 216, 220 (Okla. 1941) 
(holding that the purpose of the notice requirement is to give the public “an opportunity to appear 
before the Legislature and remonstrate against the passage of such law if they did not think it was 
wise” (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 113 P. 944, 949 (Okla. 1911))). 
 345.  DEAN, supra note 119, at 249 (describing the contested private bill process in Parlia-
ment); MAY, supra note 52, at 825 (describing Parliament’s consideration of private bills as a ju-
dicial proceeding). 
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Commons’s private bill procedure resembles a contested court proceeding, 
where “persons whose private interests are to be promoted appear as suitors 
for the bill, while those who apprehend injury are admitted as adverse par-
ties in the suit.”346  Like paying a court filing fee, the promoters of a private 
bill are required to pay a fee in order to pursue their claim.347  Affected par-
ties must be provided notice of the private bill, and failure to do so voids 
the proceedings.348  A committee of members of the House of Commons 
sits as a court349 and the hearing proceeds like a trial: parties are entitled to 
present arguments in person, summon witnesses, and tender written evi-
dence;350 live witnesses can be compelled to testify and are subject to cross-
examination;351 the witnesses are examined under oath by the interested 
parties;352 and the committee takes evidence on, and tries only the matters 
asserted in, the bill.353  After conducting an adversarial proceeding, the 
committee can grant relief to the suitor based only on the facts asserted in 
the bill as proved by the evidence presented.354 
Parliamentary practice gave rise to similar practices in the American 
colonies.355  For the purpose of settling private claims with special bills, co-
lonial legislatures created legislative committees to handle private peti-
tions.356  These committees would investigate the facts presented,357 sum-
mon witnesses,358 “accept and consider evidence from all interested parties” 
in trial-type proceedings, and rule on the claims.359 
                                                          
 346.  MAY, supra note 52, at 825; see HOUSE OF COMMONS PRIVATE BILL OFFICE, GUIDANCE 
ON PETITIONING AGAINST A PRIVATE BILL IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2018, at 3–5 (UK) (de-
scribing the process for petitioning against a private bill); STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS: PRIVATE BUSINESS SO 127, at 53 (2017) (UK) [hereinafter STANDING ORDERS] (de-
scribing proceedings in cases of private petitions). 
 347.  STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, at 97 (Table of Fees); DEAN, supra note 119, at 232 
(describing fees to be paid by private bill promoters). 
 348.  STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SOs 4(1), 10(1), 22, at 5, 8, 14; MAY supra note 52, 
at 843, 892–93. 
 349.  STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SOs 89–91, at 43–44. 
 350.  MAY, supra note 52, at 944–45; STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SOs 13–16, at 137–
36 (Rules for the Practice and Procedure of the Court of Referees on Private Bills) (describing the 
reception of oral and written evidence). 
 351.  MAY, supra note 52, at 944–45. 
 352.  Id. 
 353.  STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SO 136, at 55. 
 354.  MAY, supra note 52, at 953; STANDING ORDERS, supra note 346, SOs 136, 142, at 55, 
56. 
 355.  HARLOW, supra note 123, at 11, 14, 20, 64 (describing the development of standing 
committees in colonial legislatures to deal with petitions); Desan, supra note 125, at 192 (same). 
 356.  HARLOW, supra note 123, at 11, 20, 64; Desan, supra note 125, at 192. 
 357.  HARLOW, supra note 123, at 14, 16. 
 358.  Id. at 16. 
 359.  BAILEY, supra note 109, at 31. 
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2.  Notice and Participation Reduces the Cost of Special 
Legislation 
Legislatures can reduce the costs of special legislation by providing 
public notice and an opportunity to participate in the legislative process 
along the lines described above.  Notice of, and an opportunity to respond 
to, proposed special legislation will reduce the likelihood that the legislative 
process will be corrupted, reduce the likelihood that special legislation is 
enacted without deliberation, and help remove special legislation from the 
legislative agenda.  Notice and participation is less likely to reduce legisla-
tion that is enacted for the public benefit or legislation that will decrease 
disuniformity in the law. 
First, notice and an opportunity to participate will reduce special legis-
lation reflecting the corruption of the legislative process.  Notice will reduce 
special legislation procured through bribery by shedding light on the actions 
of legislators themselves.  Even the (admittedly rare) legislator inclined to 
introduce and support legislation for an overtly corrupt purpose will be less 
willing to do so when public notice threatens to expose the arrangement and 
embarrass the self-dealing legislator.360 
Notice and participation will also reduce legislation designed to bene-
fit a politically powerful individual rather than the public.  As noted, a per-
son who stands to benefit from a special bill has a strong motivation to in-
fluence a legislator to introduce and support it.  And a legislator who 
proposes a special bill on behalf of a particular beneficiary can often rely on 
a culture of logrolling for its passage.361  As a result of logrolling, it is often 
the case that a special bill that is deeply important to one constituent, and of 
little consequence to others, is enacted despite the fact that it serves little or 
no purpose other than to enrich the beneficiary.362  The requirement of no-
tice before a special law is enacted will mitigate the effects of logrolling.  
Notice that a special bill has been proposed will alert constituents that a 
special benefit may be distributed and encourage otherwise minimally in-
terested members of the public to pay attention to the potential impact of 
the bill, inquire into its necessity, and oppose it if they deem it unwise.363 
                                                          
 360.  PARKER, supra note 107, at 40 (“[T]he longer a legislator is involved in favor selling the 
greater the risk of being found out and punished.”); Coglianese et al., supra note 319, at 298 (ar-
guing that transparency encourages the public to “pull the alarm on extreme forms of agency 
wrongdoing, such as corruption”); Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 319, at 334 (“Transparency can 
help reduce corruption by exposing the corrupt relationships to public opprobrium . . . .”). 
 361.  Ireland, supra note 46, at 273–75. 
 362.  PARKER, supra note 107, at 30–31; see Gillette, supra note 46, at 648–49 (describing 
logrolling in the context of special legislation). 
 363.  Burnett v. Chilton Cty. Health Care Auth., No. 1160958, 2018 WL 4177518, at *6 (Ala. 
Aug. 31, 2018) (holding that the notice requirement for special legislation was intended to provide 
opponents “a fair opportunity to protest against and oppose its enactment” (quoting Wallace v. Bd. 
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Second, notice and opportunity to participate will reduce special laws 
that fail to reflect deliberation.  Notice and participation facilitate delibera-
tion by slowing down the legislative process, extending the time between 
formulation of the text of the bill and its enactment.  This delay ensures that 
legislators have an extended opportunity to review and discuss a bill before 
voting on it.364  Perhaps more importantly, notice and an opportunity for 
participation will permit those affected by the laws—not just members of 
the legislature—to make their views known.  By exposing legislators to a 
diverse set of views, a requirement of notice and an opportunity to partici-
pate will ensure that legislators are aware of the full range of the public’s 
views on the proposed legislation.  The public airing of differing views on 
proposed legislation make it more difficult, politically, for legislators to ig-
nore these views. 
Third, notice and an opportunity to participate will help remove un-
popular special legislation from the legislative agenda.  By exposing its 
proponents to additional public scrutiny, and by slowing down the process 
generally, notice and opportunity for participation will increase the cost of 
promoting special legislation.  This increased cost should reduce their sup-
ply, that is, the frequency of their introduction.  A legislator with limited 
time and political capital is unlikely to waste much time on bills that are un-
likely to pass because of the significant cost associated with their passage.  
As a result, a notice and participation requirement should reduce the num-
ber of special bills that are introduced, which, in turn, will free up legisla-
tive time for deliberation about more promising legislation. 
Fourth, although notice and public participation would reduce costly 
special legislation, it would be less likely to reduce beneficial special legis-
lation, like legislation that has a public purpose and legislation that reduces 
disuniformity in the law.  Special legislation that has a public purpose 
would likely not be discouraged by a requirement for notice and participa-
tion.  If a proposed law has a public purpose rather than a private purpose, 
then publicity due to notice and participation should not dissuade legislators 
from supporting it.  Even more, a proposed law with broad public support 
should be more popular after notice and public participation.  Indeed, legis-
lators might seek to prioritize a special law with broad public support over 
an equally meritorious bill without public support.  Similarly, the passage of 
a special bill that seeks to reduce disuniformity by eliminating a special 
privilege should not be impeded by notice and public participation.  A spe-
                                                          
of Revenue, 37 So. 321, 323 (1904))); State v. Ward, 118 P.2d 216, 220 (Okla. 1941) (holding that 
the purpose of the notice requirements is to give the public “an opportunity to appear before the 
Legislature and remonstrate against the passage of such law if they did not think it was wise”). 
 364.  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 n.23 (1983) (noting that a more elaborate legislative 
process provides opportunity for debate and deliberation).  For example, in a number of states, the 
notice period before special legislation can be enacted is one month.  See supra note 340.  
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cial bill to take away a special privilege would likely be popular; as with a 
special law with a public purpose, notice and public participation should 
only increase the likelihood of the enactment of a special law eliminating a 
special privilege. 
There are two situations in which notice and public participation might 
impede beneficial special legislation.  As discussed above, emergency spe-
cial legislation, like the Utah statute designed to incentivize a railway to 
help avoid massive flooding, will likely prove popular once its purpose is 
publicized.365  For this reason, notice and public participation would likely 
not prevent emergency special legislation.  However, because of the delay 
inherent in a process of notice and public participation, even very popular 
special legislation might be rendered moot by the time it can be enacted. 
In addition, a special law that reduces disuniformity by curing a defect 
in the generally applicable laws, or by stripping an individual of a disabil-
ity, might be impeded by notice and public participation.  Take, for exam-
ple, the O’Brian case, in which the Maryland legislature enacted a special 
law to allow a contractor to be paid after a generally applicable law mistak-
enly prevented him from being paid for work already completed.366  Alt-
hough there are obvious equitable reasons for the legislature to support the 
contractor’s special bill, only the contractor’s representative in the legisla-
ture has a direct interest in supporting a special bill for the contractor’s ben-
efit.  Other members of the legislature may believe they have little to gain 
from supporting a special law for the benefit of a non-constituent.  And 
members of the public might prefer to spare the public the cost of making 
the contractor whole even though the cost would be minimal for each mem-
ber of the public.  In this case, notice and participation may prevent a spe-
cial law where, in the absence of notice and participation, it would have 
been passed due to logrolling and public disinterest.367 
D.  Legislative Reason-Giving 
Official reason-giving by the legislature—or by some body empow-
ered by the legislature to give reasons for the enactment of legislation—can 
reduce the costs of special legislation without eliminating its benefits.   
                                                          
 365.  See supra Section III.B. 
 366.  O’Brian v. Cty. Comm’rs, 51 Md. 15, 20–21 (1879). 
 367.  An objection to modeling public participation for special legislation on the notice and 
comment process is the fact that few people participate in the notice and comment process.  See 
BALLA, supra note 332, at 25–26.  However, because legislators have an incentive to publicize 
both the legislative action and inaction of themselves and others, it is likely that participation 
would be more robust for proposed legislation than for administrative agency rulemaking.  
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1.  Models of Legislative Reason-Giving 
Although the Constitution requires each chamber of Congress to keep 
and publish a journal of its proceedings,368 there is no constitutional re-
quirement either for individual legislators,369 or for the legislature as a 
whole,370 to explain the introduction or enactment of a bill.371  Nevertheless, 
committee reports, authored by congressional372 and some state legisla-
tive373 committees, often provide robust explanations for the enactment of 
legislation.  More specifically, both state and federal practice have models 
for official reason-giving to accompany the enactment of special legislation.  
First, some states require official reason-giving as part of the enactment of 
special legislation.374  For example, Mississippi’s constitution broadly pro-
hibits special laws;375 however, it also provides a safe harbor for the enact-
ment of special legislation, provided that the legislature gives reasons for its 
enactment.376  Specifically, Mississippi requires each chamber of its legisla-
ture to appoint a standing committee on local and private legislation.  Be-
fore it is enacted, every special bill must be referred to this standing com-
mittee, which must report back to the legislature “with a recommendation in 
writing” to enact the special law, “stating affirmatively the reasons there-
for.”377  Recalling British tradition that extends back to the Middle Ages,378 
the committee must also state “why the end to be accomplished should not 
                                                          
 368.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; see also STORY, supra note 278, at 590–92 (explaining the Con-
stitution’s Journal Clause).  
 369.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (providing that a member of Congress may not be questioned 
in any other place for a speech or debate given in Congress); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 
U.S. 168, 204 (1880) (extending Speech or Debate Clause protections to “the act of voting”). 
 370.  Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing exclusive lawmaking prerequisites); see also U.S. 
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“[T]his Court has never insisted that a legislative 
body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.”). 
 371.  See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636–38 (1995) (con-
trasting the typical absence of reason giving in statutory language with judicial or executive rea-
son giving). 
 372.  WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 119 
(4th ed. 1996) (describing the committee report process). 
 373.  In most state legislatures, legislative history, including committee reports, plays a limited 
role.  Richard A. Briffault, Beyond Congress: The Study of State and Local Legislatures, 7 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25 (2003). 
 374.  MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 89; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
 375.  MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 87. 
 376.  Id. § 89. 
 377.  Id. 
 378.  DODD, supra note 121, at 80–81 (explaining that Parliament would reject private petitions 
on the ground that the matter could be adequately resolved by a court under the common law).  
Similarly, in early Congresses, even meritorious petitions for special laws were rejected if Con-
gress anticipated later enacting a general law to cover the situation.  diGiacomantonio, supra note 
117, at 39. 
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be reached by a general law, or by a proceeding in court.”379  In this model, 
the legislature is empowered to enact special legislation, but only if a legis-
lative committee explains why a special law is the appropriate way to ad-
dress the problem.380 
Second, although, most federal statutes are not accompanied by de-
tailed official reasons for their enactment, a relatively obscure corner of 
federal practice maintains a role for legislative reason-giving for certain 
types of special laws.381  By resolution, either chamber of Congress may re-
fer a bill seeking money from the Treasury to the United States Court of 
Federal Claims.382  Either chamber of Congress may refer this type of spe-
cial bill when the relief sought cannot be obtained through the normal legal 
processes, for example, when the limitations period has run383 or because 
sovereign immunity prevents a suit.384 
When the Court of Federal Claims receives a bill referred to it by a 
chamber of Congress, it is required to ascertain whether the demand con-
tained in the bill is “a legal or equitable claim,” as opposed to a gratuity, 
and the amount due from the United States to the claimant.385  In order to 
make this determination, the court conducts a hearing that, although adviso-
ry in nature, bears the hallmarks of a judicial trial.  The court has the power 
to issue subpoenas, take testimony, and hear argument, all for the purpose 
of determining whether a claim is meritorious.  Ultimately, the court must 
submit its findings of fact and legal conclusions as a “report” to the cham-
ber of Congress that referred the case.386  Although it is merely advisory, 
                                                          
 379.  MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 89.  
 380.  In the case of Mississippi, the constitutional requirement of official reason-giving relies 
on legislative self-enforcement; the courts “will not consult legislative journals to determine 
whether” the legislature complied with the reference and recommendation process or invalidate a 
special law in the absence of evidence that it did so.  Tunica Cty. v. Town of Tunica, 227 So. 3d 
1007, 1022–23 (Miss. 2017). 
 381.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (2012) (describing the process by which private bills are re-
ferred to the United States Court of Federal Claims). 
 382.  Id. § 1492.  Not all bills for money damages can be referred to the Court of Federal 
Claims. For example, § 1492 expressly excludes pensions.  Id. 
 383.  Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 394, 407 n.13 (2011), aff’d, 697 F.3d 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that the running of a statute of limitations may make a case “appro-
priate for a congressional reference, wherein a bill is referred to the chief judge of this court by 
either house of Congress for review by a three judge panel”). 
 384.  Cal. Canners & Growers Ass’n v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 69, 74, 86 (1984) (recognizing 
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar consideration of congressional reference 
claims). 
 385.  28 U.S.C. § 2509(c); see H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL JUSTICE, 114TH CONG., RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR PRIVATE CLAIMS 
BILLS 72 (Comm. Print 2015) (describing principles guiding the committee’s consideration of 
claims). 
 386.  28 U.S.C. § 2509(b)–(e). 
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the report transmitted to Congress has the form and level of detail of a judi-
cial opinion.387 
2.  Legislative Reason-Giving Reduces the Cost of Special 
Legislation 
A legislative reason-giving requirement along the lines of the models 
described above can reduce the costs of special legislation without eliminat-
ing its benefits entirely.  First, a rule requiring reason-giving to accompany 
special legislation will reduce the likelihood that special legislation reflect-
ing corruption is enacted.  Requiring a reasoned explanation for the enact-
ment of special legislation will help make the purpose of the special law 
transparent.  Transparency, in turn, gives the public the opportunity to “pull 
the alarm on . . . [the] corruption” that drives some special legislation.388  
Similarly, once the reasoning underlying the special law is laid bare, other 
legislators will have an opportunity to challenge it and expose it if it lacks a 
public purpose.  Just as it is easier to respond effectively to a reasoned ar-
gument than to an ipse dixit conclusion, because the premises and support-
ing evidence of a reasoned argument are revealed, it is easier to test the 
soundness of a statute accompanied by official reasons than a statute with-
out them.  Put another way, requiring reason-giving will reveal the faulty 
premises and logical flaws in an explanation of a hard-to-justify special 
law.389 
Second, giving reasons will reduce the statutory imposition of unjusti-
fiable inequalities by exposing those inequalities that cannot be justified.  
As Professor Frederick Schauer has explained, the act of providing reasons 
for a particular outcome presupposes that there is a general rule that drives 
that outcome.390  Consider Schauer’s example: “You ask why I am carrying 
an umbrella, and I respond that the weather forecast predicted rain.  Alt-
hough the response is not explicitly prescriptive, it embraces the mandate, 
‘Carry an umbrella when rain is forecast’ . . . .”391  In other words, by 
providing a reason for carrying the umbrella, the carrier implicitly states a 
general rule that controls similar cases.  Any time rain is forecast, one 
would expect to see the carrier with an umbrella. 
Because reason-giving requires the statement, explicitly or implicitly, 
of a general principle, a legislature giving reasons for a special law will 
have a hard time explaining the principle underlying a law that creates un-
justified inequalities.  Take for example the Tesla Laws, described above, 
                                                          
 387.  Sneeden v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 671, 672 (1994). 
 388.  Coglianese et al., supra note 319, at 928. 
 389.  See Schauer, supra note 371, at 652–53. 
 390.  Id. at 642–43. 
 391.  Id. at 642. 
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that created special exemptions for Tesla and no other carmaker to sell elec-
tric cars outside of the traditional manufacturer-dealer relationship.392  Per-
haps, as Tesla argued when Maryland’s Tesla Law was passed, a legislator 
would assert that the purpose of the law was to encourage “innovation,” 
“free markets,” and “consumer choice.”393  But, of course, none of these 
reasons—innovation, free markets, or consumer choice—justifies a Tesla-
specific law rather than a generally applicable law.  Indeed, if any of these 
principles were the real goal of Maryland’s Tesla Law, a generally applica-
ble law would have been a better fit.  Consumer choice and free markets 
would be enhanced by a law permitting all manufacturers of electric cars to 
take advantage of the new leniencies accorded to Tesla.  And, opening 
Maryland’s automobile market to future electric carmakers would encour-
age innovation through competition.  Maryland’s Tesla Law, in fact, stifled 
free-market competition, and with it, innovation, by providing Tesla with 
protection from competitors; and it limited consumer choice by restricting 
entry into the electric car market.  A reason-giving requirement would ex-
pose the unjustifiable inequality imposed by Maryland’s Tesla Law.  If re-
quired to give a reason for its unequal treatment of Tesla, the Maryland leg-
islature would have had to generalize the law, strain to distinguish Tesla 
from present and future competitors in a meaningful way, or admit that the 
purpose was to accord a special benefit to Tesla.394 
Third, special legislation reflecting justifiable inequalities would likely 
not be eliminated because of a requirement for legislative reason-giving.  
Rather, special laws imposing justifiable inequalities would be easy to ex-
plain through legislative reason-giving.  Consider, again, the Utah indemni-
ty law that encouraged a railway to breach the Great Salt Lake causeway.395  
If Utah’s legislature had to give reasons for this special law, it would be 
able to generalize the decision to indemnify the railway by explaining that 
anyone should be protected from liability for property damage when acting 
to avert greater damage.  This principle is easily justifiable because it is co-
herent with other areas of the law that recognize a defense for those acting 
to avoid a greater harm.396  As a result, the Utah legislature, if forced to ex-
                                                          
 392.  E.g., MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 15-305(e)(2) (West 2010 & Supp. 2018). 
 393.  Debord, supra note 1. 
 394.  A reason-giving requirement would also, in part, mitigate the fact that special legislation 
often fails to provide guidance.  Although special legislation interferes with the coherence of the 
law and makes it less predictable, legislative reason-giving should both publicize these exceptions 
and explain their limits.  The contextualization of a special law should provide guidance about the 
scope of its application. 
 395.  Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 623 (Utah 1990). 
 396.  E.g., State v. Wells, 598 N.W.2d 30, 35 (Neb. 1999) (holding that a defendant’s evidence 
of the defense of justification or “choice of evils” includes “facts showing that he or she (1) acted 
to avoid a greater harm; (2) reasonably believed that the particular action was necessary to avoid a 
specific and immediately imminent harm; and (3) reasonably believed that the selected action was 
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plain the special indemnity law, could have made a cogent, well-reasoned 
argument as to why it was in the public interest. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The legislature is charged with many of the difficult policy decisions 
that governments must make.  In order to ensure that it is acting in the pub-
lic interest, rather than out of pique or favoritism, the legislature must un-
dertake the task of weighing the costs and benefits of proposed legislation.  
Legislative rules can help accomplish a legislature’s goal of enacting laws 
with benefits that outweigh their costs.  By requiring special legislation to 
be enacted only by a supermajority, requiring notice and allowing for public 
participation, or requiring official reasons to accompany the enactment of 
special laws, legislatures will make it more difficult to enact special laws 
that create significant costs.  By adopting and adhering to these legislative 
rules, legislatures will better be able to ensure that they are promoting the 
public welfare. 
                                                          
the least harmful alternative to avoid the harm”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1962) (setting out elements for the defense of choice of evils). 
